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Introduction
“We were told that carbon comes from the industries in the western countries 
and is consumed by our trees. Carbon dioxide feeds the tree and makes it 
grow strong and also makes it release oxygen that is needed for humans. 
So the incomes from the factories in the western countries will benefit the 
poor who are protecting the forest”.
This is a quote1 from a Tanzanian village Chairperson. His village had been included 
in a REDD project (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, see 
Box 2) for one year when he spoke these words. With the objective to maintain/
improve a globally important ecosystem service: carbon sequestration from the 
atmosphere into forest trees, the REDD project intends to pay villagers to refrain 
from using the forest.
Ecosystems, such as forests, rivers and oceans, provide services that are essential for 
human life: sequestration of carbon dioxide, water retention, erosion control, climate 
regulation etc. (see Box 1). There is growing global attention on the development of 
incentive schemes, termed “Payment for Ecosystem Service” (PES, see section 1.1), 
with the goal being to maintain, develop and protect ecosystem service. REDD is one 
such initiative in the global climate change arena, aiming at protecting forest land to 
secure carbon sequestration, protect biodiversity, water and nutrient cycles, etc.  PES 
is one of several key projects that are now changing land use globally. Donors and 
international development agencies are getting increasingly involved in the funding 
and development of different PES projects, like paying local communities to protect 
forest areas. When global plan incentives like PES are implemented in local contexts, 
both opportunities and challenges arise. Some claim that PES initiatives hold opportu-
nity for poverty reduction, however, although PES initiatives are often implemented 
in poor regions, poverty reduction is seldom an explicit objective of these projects. 
In many situations, the ecosystems and the service they provide are very important 
to poor rural people, who are often directly dependant on natural resources for their 
daily lives. Projects that restrict the poor to the access of such resources could then 
even have the opposite effect of increasing poverty. It is therefore important to care-
fully study the effects on local peoples of the implementation of major PES projects, 
such as REDD.
Another type of challenge is illustrated by the words of the Tanzanian Chairperson, 
as quoted above. How can PES initiatives like REDD be communicated in a way so 
that local people can understand, and how can the relevance of REDD be explained 
to them? How can they effectively participate in the project? How can a sense of 
ownership over land and resources be maintained? How is it possible to empower 
1 As translated to us from Kiswahili to English
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local people to make independent decisions regarding the REDD project and local 
resources? These questions are factors that have been proven to be important in 
order to obtain long term sustainable development (Mosse 1996; Scoones 2007 etc.). 
Larsen and Ribot (2009) conclude that REDD (Box 2) is more likely to be locally 
legitimate if the design, implementation and allocation of benefits represent local 
needs and aspirations. The level at which rules are made and benefits distributed will 
be a key issue in the legitimacy, effectiveness, efficiency and equity of REDD. The 
opportunities that REDD offers to smallholders depend on the local context, but 
could be for example, monetary income, and increased participation by local com-
munities in natural resource management. However, many actors question whether it 
is likely that monetary incomes actually materialise (see the Tanzanian case) or if PES 
initiatives actually increase participation (see the Vietnam case).
Our points of entry for this report have been that:
1. Ecosystem services are fundamental for life support.
2. Land where ecosystem service are to be provided is already habitated and 
used in different ways to provide local people a source of livelihood.
The report directs itself to actors in development cooperation, who engage with 
policies and programs of PES and REDD. It seeks to draw attention to the range 
of approaches to ecosystem service provision and management. When major PES 
initiatives and plans are discussed in the global discussion on climate mitigation, we 
suggest that there is insufficient attention to the local forms of ecosystem manage-
ment that already exist. We direct ourselves to decision makers who are not only 
interested in the quantity of carbon sequestration in the PES initiatives, but who 
have an interest in how the projects relate to issues like democracy, ownership and, 
ultimately, a pro poor development. The report builds on conclusions and lessons 
drawn from case studies carried out in four different continents, describing a range 
of contexts where PES projects are being implemented, as well as contrasting case 
studies of alternative forms of ecosystem service provision and management, in 
which local communities themselves have created provisioning systems (although 
sometimes with external assistance). With the study, we want to highlight and analyse 
the potentials of and the problems related to, different approaches to ecosystem 
service management. This also includes lifting the discussion on how local initiatives, 
integrating goals of conservation and livelihoods development, to the next level and 
examine how this information can be brought into the development and donor 
agenda of supporting climate mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development.
The structure of the report unfolds in four chapters:
•	 The first chapter is a critical review of the concepts of PES and REDD, the 
international context of implementing PES programs, as well as alternative 
approaches to ecosystem service provisioning. 
•	 The second chapter introduces the methodology and scope of the study. 
•	 The third chapter covers the case studies from Brazil, Peru, Tanzania, Vietnam 
and Sweden.
•	 The fourth chapter contains the comparative discussion.
•	 The fifth chapter concludes the report with a concluding discussion and rec-
ommendations. 
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Ecosystem services are defined as ‘processes and conditions through which ecosys-
tems support human life’ (Daily 1997). The UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(MEA) tightly linked the human condition to environmental conditions and estab-
lished the concept of dividing ecosystem service into four categories: supporting, 
provisioning, regulating and cultural service (see below). Supporting service are 
regarded as the most difficult to manage, because they are often taken for granted 
(Rodríguez et al. 2006). 
Box 1.  
Ecosystem service 
 
Supporting services:
Ecosystem	services	that	are	
necessary	for	the	production	
of	all	the	other	services	in	
ecosystems
o Maintenance	of	soil	
resources
o Water	cycle	
o Carbon	and	nutrient	
cycling
o Maintenance	of	
biological	diversity	
o Maintenance	of	
disturbance	regime
 
 
 
Provisioning Service:
Products	provided	by	the	ecosystems
o Food
o Fresh	water
o Firewood/fuel/construction	material
o Fibers
o Biochemistry
o Genetic	resources
Regulating Services: 
Beneficiaries	related	to	regulation	of	the	
ecosystem	processes
o Climate	regulation
o Control	of	pests,	invasions	and	
diseases
o Erosion
o Quantity	and	quality	of	water,	
pollution
o Disturbance	propagation
o Pollination
Cultural Services:
Non-material	beneficiaries	coming	from	
ecosystems	
o Cultural	identity	and	cultural	heritage
o Spiritual,	inspirational,	aesthetic	
benefits
o Recreation	and	ecotourism
Source: Adapted from the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) and Chapin et al. (2009).
| Does paying pay off? Paying for ecosystem services and exploring alternative possibilities8
1. Presentation of PES and alternative 
approaches to support ecosystem 
service provision
In this report, we discuss two principal approaches for encouraging local ecosystem 
managers to regulate and value ecosystem service provision: 
1. by creating a market system for ecosystem service and paying for ecosystem 
service provisioning, and
2. supporting forest/agricultural production systems that integrate production 
of food, fibres and fuel with provision of ecosystem services, often based on 
local resources or ecosystem services.
1.1. The PES approach
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) is an economic instrument designed at a 
global and national level, with the aim to provide incentives for land users for con-
tinued or improved provision of a specific ecosystem service. PES is mainly aimed 
to be implemented by rural people in developing countries, which is considered 
cost effective by its designers, and the intention is that paying people to adopt more 
“environmentally friendly” systems of production could result both in poverty 
reduction and increased environmental benefits. Moreover, many key global ecosys-
tems are situated in these countries2. 
The core of this approach is to pay social groups, such as indigenous people and 
smallholders, to protect, manage or restore the ecosystem service provisioning sys-
tem. For example, payments are made to land users:
•	 to develop the provision of one specific ecosystem service, e.g. by growing 
trees for carbon sequestration
•	 to protect existing ecosystem service provision, e.g. protecting tropical forests, 
as in the REDD mechanism of the Kyoto protocol
•	 to refrain from using an area in a way that could threaten the ecosystem 
service in question, or not to use it at all, for example in wildlife protection 
projects in tourism areas (Nelson and Sulle 2009). 
So far, PES schemes focus mainly on water, carbon, or biodiversity and respond to 
public, but increasingly also to private, interest in addressing an environmental prob-
2  http://www.fao.org/es/esa/pesal/aboutPES.html
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lem through incentive schemes to land managers. This is happening in a global context 
where increasing human demands for food, fibre and fuel is accelerating competition 
for land (Chappell and LaValle 2011). Production of these commodities is dependent on 
several key ecosystem services, such as pollination, soil fertility and water retention, and 
it has been recognized that decreasing capacity for ecosystem service provision may 
jeopardize future food production (e.g. MEA 2005; Rockström et al. 2009). Many PES 
initiatives are being implemented, more or less solely, with a ‘conservation perspective’ 
rather than seeing ecosystem services as integrated with production and livelihoods. This 
will be further discussed in the case studies and conclusions.
In this report, we have chosen to only use the concept ‘Payment for Ecosystem 
Services’ - PES. There are several related terms that are utilised in practice, for exam-
ple, Payment for Environmental Services and Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services. 
We use the PES concept to cover all these terms.
1.2. Alternative approaches to ecosystem service 
management
There are many approaches to ecosystem service management. Some build on 
the idea that production and conservation cannot be separate in time and space, 
but will have to be planned for within the same landscape and production systems 
(e.g. the eco-agricultural approach described by Scherr and McNeely 2008). Many 
smallholders already practice such approaches that integrate and maintain ecosys-
tem services in agricultural/forest production systems in a long-term perspective. 
Agricultural land and forests are managed to produce food, fibre and fuel produc-
tion, for households’ own consumption as well as for sale. In such a system, the local 
communities are totally dependent on ecosystem services to re-generate conditions 
for agricultural production and/or forest extraction. The focus in farming/forestry 
systems is on increasing agricultural/forest production by supporting local ecosystem 
services (such as soil fertility and structure, pollination, micro climate, biological 
control of crop pests, etc.). The ecosystem service functions, operating on regional 
and global scales (such as carbon sequestration and climate regulation), will come out 
as a ‘by-product’, e.g. carbon sequestration by increased soil humus in a fertile soil, 
bio mass accumulation, etc. Interest in this approach to ecosystem service provision 
by small-scale farming is increasing and was recently described in a UN report to 
the Human Rights Council (De Schutter 2010) and the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD 2007).
The PES approach is widely supported by a number of actors, not least nation states, 
multilateral development agencies, transnational corporations and international 
NGOs. The way in which PES is emerging as a large scale global initiative resembles 
what Scott (1999) refers to as a transnational master plan. A ‘master plan’ can be defined 
as an overarching blueprint, consisting of specific discourses and planned actions, 
which define and implement solutions to large-scale problems, without taking local 
economic, social and cultural contexts into consideration. Such master plans are 
often made up of administrative and economic blueprints, spanning everything from 
the design of cities, cash-crop plantations and economic measures, such as structural 
adjustment programs (Boli and Thomas 1999; Scott 1999). The PES approach, not 
least the REDD projects, in many respects function as a master plan. This plan 
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includes several global tenets; how to interpret the concept of ecosystem services, 
discourses about how market based solutions can make local target groups abstain 
from utilizing these services, by using monetary compensations so as to change 
people’s use and imagination of forest resources. Scott draws attention to the fact that 
implemented master plans often have led to unintended consequences, overthrowing 
or drastically revising the planned outcomes (Scott 1999). These plans frequently do not 
have the flexibility to handle the social, economic and culturally unique contexts they 
encounter in local settings (Appadurai 1996). There are thus strong reasons to scrutinize 
and analyse the actual outcomes of concrete PES projects at the local level and compare 
them with the intended outcomes. 
PES is rapidly becoming a social arena of specific discourses, actions and conten-
tions (Bourdieu 2007), where a large number of actors struggle with how to define 
the ecosystem service concept, how the services donations shall be paid for and 
distributed, how the schemes shall be monitored and audited, how to ensure that 
local communities benefit, etc. The actors of this social arena create a specific form 
of interpretive framing of how the problem of degradation of natural resources and 
green house gas emissions can be mitigated and acted upon. 
Box 2.  
REDD – Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
REDD	means	‘Reducing	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	Forest	Degradation’.	It	is	
a	part	of	the	UNFCCC	(United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change),	
aiming	at	enhancing	the	carbon	sequestration	capacity	of	forests,	and	to	prevent	
green	house	gas	emissions	resulting	from	deforestation.	REDD	was	put	on	the	climate	
change	negotiations	agenda	for	the	post	Kyoto	agreement	in	Bali	2007,	and	was	further	
developed	at	the	Copenhagen	meeting	in	2009.	REDD	is	an	effort	to	create	a	financial	
value	for	the	carbon	stored	in	forests,	thereby	offering	incentives	for	developing	
countries	to	reduce	emissions	from	deforestation,	REDD	is	in	some	countries	becoming	
a	mega	scale	venture,	where	for	example	Brazil	will	offset	320	000	km2	in	the	Amazon	
region	(an	area	equivalent	to	two	thirds	of	Sweden	(Serviço	Florestal	Brasileiro	2010).	
REDD+	and	REDD++.	REDD	has	been	further	developed	into	what	is	called	REDD+,	
which	goes	beyond	deforestation	and	forest	degradation,	and	includes	the	role	of	
conservation,	sustainable	management	of	forests	and	enhancement	of	forest	carbon	
stocks.	A	third	version	of	the	REDD	scheme	is	called	REDD++,	which	includes	
measures	impacting	on	carbon	balance;	even	on	land	not	defined	as	forest.	
REDD and Poverty reduction.	The	text	on	REDD	produced	at	the	UNFCCC	
Conference	of	Parties	(COP)	16	does	not	mention	poverty	reduction	as	an	inclusive	
aim.	However,	the	importance	of	including	poor	people	and	their	needs	and	interests	
when	implementing	REDD	has	been	emphasized	in	various	contexts	(e.g.	Eklöf	2011),	
and	are	included	in	the	objectives	of	some	REDD	initiatives	(see	the	cases	from	
Tanzania	and	Vietnam).
Sources:	Eklöf	(2011);	http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/,	UNFCCC	
official	text	on	COP	16	REDD	agreement;	Ministerio	do	Meio	Ambiente	(2010).	
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1.3. Recent criticism requires further research
The PES approach has its origin in highlighting the importance of services from 
‘nature’, which previously have not been paid for. Ecosystems produce services and 
goods for human societies, but also for general life support to all living organisms. 
Calling them services can be misleading. On the one hand it makes them easier to 
be internalized in the global monetary economic discourse. On the other hand it 
could over-simplify the very complex issue of how these systems provide life sup-
portive functions from natural resources, under human management. These issues 
have been scrutinized by researchers such as Norgaard (2010), Muradian et al. (2010), 
van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) and Shelley (2011). Their criticisms are focused 
on the concern as to how the PES approach, to a large extent, takes its starting point 
from a global context of ecosystem service governance. They point to constraints in 
the process of adapting these schemes to local conditions and the need for develop-
ing the approaches in the local context (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Shelley 
2011). There are also critical views that consider the difficulties involved in evaluat-
ing the ecosystem service that will be paid for (Kumar and Kumar 2008).
The concept of payment of ecosystem services requires the setting of a price on nat-
ural resources that previously have not been part of a market economy, resulting in 
a so called process of ‘commodification’ (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Kosoy and 
Corbera 2010; Vatn 2010). This price is set within an economy where it is assumed 
that the price transcends the economic opportunities for alternative usages (cf. Engel 
et al. 2008), thus gradually introducing the ecosystems into an emerging market 
economy sphere. Many of the social groups who are potential beneficiaries have 
never perceived these ecosystems in financial terms (Maybury-Lewis 2006; Århem 
et al. 2004) but have accorded them a use-value for the members of the community. 
By the act of giving an economic value to these services, their very economic and 
symbolic functions risk being transformed from use value to exchange value, which 
may have considerable social and cultural implications (e.g. Hènaff 2010; Taussig 
1980). When for example commons have been awarded a specific economic value, 
it has often led to social tensions within the group concerned, risks that the elite 
will appropriate the resources for themselves, and changes in social structure (cf. 
Gudeman 2001). These plausible impacts on the communities that will sign the PES 
contracts are not discussed in policy documents and have so far been insufficiently 
studied.
Several donors believe that the PES approach constitutes a possible approach to 
poverty alleviation. However, this expectation is heavily questioned (e.g. Plagiola et 
al. 2005). Recent research sheds light on the challenges involved in the implementa-
tion of PES projects from perspectives of pro-poor, democratic and sustainability 
development. Obstacles that have been described include unequal power relations, 
corruption, unfair compensation rates, low political will and lack of participation and 
understanding among target groups – including the poor (Pokorny et al. 2012; Thuy 
et al. 2010). 
Another line of criticism against PES comes from van Noordwijk et al. (2009) who 
argue that the debate has focused too much on forest conservation, as compared to 
ecosystem services from a broader range of land use types. They refer to research 
supporting the position that it is not only forests that can provide the ecosystem ser-
vices and the watershed functions that we associate with them. This would open up 
for PES models that have an integrated perspective on forest and agriculture, conser-
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vation and production, and a larger focus on livelihood than was previously the case.
There are few ethnographic studies on the impacts of PES initiatives on the 
communities involved. Furthermore, there are few studies made on the ongoing 
economic, political and social struggles and negotiations over forest management, 
and the manner in which local communities are engaged with and affected by the 
changing roles within this field (Corbera and Schroeder 2011). The relative power of 
the actors within the field varies depending on their economic, political and social 
capital (cf. Bourdieu 2007). Since so much of the agenda of PES and REDD is being 
set in international negotiations, there is a great risk that the communities own abil-
ity to negotiate the conditions of local implementation is severely curtailed (Dooley 
et al. 2011; Eklöf 2011).
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2. Aim and scope of the study 
The study aims to address some of the above mentioned gaps in knowledge on local 
impact of PES schemes, an understanding of the interactions between stakeholders 
involved and the dynamics of local initiatives regarding ecosystem services. 
We are comparing contrasting cases of PES projects at the local level and alterna-
tive forms of ecosystem service provision in local productive systems, and analysing 
the cases with support from literature reviews. We want to illustrate challenges 
and potentials with different approaches to ecosystem service provision, and how 
they are articulated within specific local contexts. We have analysed some general 
similarities between the cases from four continents that are of importance for policy 
decisions on incentive structures for ecosystem service provision. The study hopes to 
contribute to the international discourse and donor approaches to the support for 
ecosystem service provision by smallholders. 
We have chosen to describe one PES initiative and one alternative approach in the 
continents of Africa, Asia, Europe and South America (Table 1), respectively. We have 
selected countries with different social and political structures, and cases with differ-
ent ecological, social and political backgrounds. Previous experiences and partner-
ships have also influenced the choice of countries and cases. 
Table	1.	Selected	case	studies.
Continent PES case Alternative case
South America Brazil	-	7	de	setembro Peru	–	San	Martin,	Lamas
Asia Vietnam	-	Da	Nhim Vietnam	-	Hong	Ha
Africa Tanzania	-	Kolo	Hills Tanzania	-	Suledo
Europe Sweden	–	conventional	farm	in	Uppland Sweden	–	organic	farms	in	Uppland
The study does not claim to cover all the impacts of PES and alternative approaches. 
Some cases focus more on the national context and civil society actors, others more 
on the narratives at local level, depending on earlier research and partner networks 
(see each case study section for information about how information has been col-
lected). The level of detail varies between cases and countries. 
More research is needed to perform a comprehensive meta-study where patterns 
identified in this study are more critically examined and further socio-political con-
texts included. 
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3. Case descriptions
3.1. Brazil 
Author:	Örjan	Bartholdson
The Brazilian case of 7 de Setembro shows how an indigenous group, Suruí, is strug-
gling to launch a REDD project from the bottom, so as to safeguard their territory, 
and, at the same time, receive financial support. It discusses the organisational and 
democratic challenges which the implementation and administration of the REDD 
projects create, and demonstrates the economic, political and social unintended side-
effects. 
The case takes place in the indigenous reserve of the paiter/Surui indigenous group, 
Terra Indígena 7 de Setembro, located within the municipalities of Cacoal, Espigão 
D’Oeste, and Rondolândia, in the state of Rôndonia in weastern Brazil.The docu-
ment which describes all details of the Surui REDD project is currently in the 
process of becoming registered and pending official approval the project will subse-
quently be launched. The project, covering 2 480 km2, intends to avoid the emission 
of 16.5 million tons of carbon dioxide by reducing logging of rainforest and will run 
until 2050.
Box 3.  
Information collection for the Brazilian case 
This	case	is	based	on	a	two	week	field-study	in	the	territory	of	the	indigenous	group	
Suruí,	7	de	Septembre,	in	the	state	of	Rondonia.	The	field-study	was	complemented	by	
interviews	with	NGO	representatives	and	members	of	the	Surui	indigenous	group,	as	
well	as	a	desk	study	in	Sweden.	
The	field-study	and	interviews	were	conducted	by	the	author	and	Bo	Johansson	April-
June	2011.
3.1.1. The national context
The Amazon rainforest covers an area of 5.5 million square kilometres, out of which 
60 percent is contained within Brazil. There are many reasons for the deforestation 
of the Brazilian Amazon rainforest, such as establishment of cattle pasture, harvesting 
of high-priced hardwood, and agriculture - both large and small scale (Bartholdson 
et al. 2008). Between 2000 and 2005, Brazil accounted for approximately half of 
Does paying pay off? Paying for ecosystem services and exploring alternative possibilities | 15
the global deforestation (Houghton 2005). There is also a large risk that the ongo-
ing climate change will affect the Amazon severely; for example, increasing rainfall 
in the center of the rainforest will cause devastating floods, while, at the same time, 
the southern regions will suffer from increased periods of droughts, which will ruin 
agricultural land and increase the dangers of forest fires, primarily in areas with 
second generation forest. These threats make the Brazilian government eager to 
implement large-scale PES projects, which are in the nation’s best interests, and not 
necessarily due to global concerns. The government’s goal is to reduce deforestation 
by 70 percent, compared to levels reached between 1996 and 2005.
Brazil is the country with largest area of land set aside for REDD schemes (Viana 
et al. 2010). The total area is intended to cover approximately 320 000 km2; 37 
percent of this area will be dedicated to REDD, 50  percent to REDD+ and 13 
percent to the so-called REDD++ projects. In total, there are currently 16 REDD 
projects in differing stages of impemenation, from those ready to be implemented 
to those that have been launched recently. The overwhelming focus of Brazil’s 
Almir Narayamoga is the most prominent leader of the indigenous people, Suruí. He has received death threats 
several times because of his struggle to maintain the forests of his people’s territory.  
Photographer: Lennart Kjörling. 
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REDD projects is on the Amazon rainforest.
One of the major bureaucratic tensions within Brazil concerning the national PES 
plan is between the federal government and the states that Brazil is divided into. The 
states that are located within the Amazon area fear that a large part of the resources 
channeled through the administration in Brasilia risk being spent on the federal 
bureaucracy.
3.1.2. Ecological and social background of the area
The classical description of Amazonian soils is that they are naturally acidic, highly 
weathered, and relatively low in available plant nutrients, which means that it is not 
primarily geological processes that contribute to soil fertility (e.g. Salati and Vose 
1984; Schroth et al. 2001). Most nutrients in the ecosystem are found in the biomass 
and with a hot and humid climate, where the process of decay goes fast, it is instead 
the vegetative processes that restore the soil fertility. Consequently, permanent farm-
ing in the Amazon is problematic (if external inputs are not added) and historically 
most farming in the Amazon has been rotational shifting cultivation systems where a 
relatively short agriculture production period has been followed by a longer tree fal-
low period. When the farmer stops actively managing the field, the land will slowly 
return to forest again and depending on the farmers’ access to land, the farmer will 
return to convert the secondary forest into a field once again, in different stages of 
the development in the fallow succession (see also the Peru case). 
A current major threat against the Amazon rainforest emerged during the 1990s: 
the conversion of land to vast soy plantations. Brazil is currently the second-largest 
global producer of soybeans (Goldsmith and Hirsch 2006). Between 1996 and 2004 
the area planted with soy in the Amazon expanded from 250 km2 to 3 170 km2.The 
majority of this expansion occurred in the states of  Tocantins and Rôndonia.
Another issue in the Brazilian Amazon is logging. The most obvious consequences 
of logging is general land degradation, when the soil’s ability to absorb precipitation 
diminishes rapidly and causes both flooding and droughts. But logging also contrib-
utes to the rapid increase of forest fires. Even when the logging is done selectively 
both the number and the intensity of forest fires increase. Gaps in the canopies of the 
trees expose the ground to sun light and wind, thus creating a drier micro climate, 
which increases the risk of forest fires. From 2004 to 2010 the rate of logging in 
Brazil dropped sharply. In 2010 approximately 8 000 km2 of land was deforested 
(INPE 2010), mainly because of improved monitoring, law enforcement and a mor-
atorium on soy plantation expansion (Butler 2011). During the first months of 2011 
the logging rate has increased compared to the same period a year ago. The main 
culprits appear to be soy plantation owners. The major part of this area was logged 
so as to provide room for cattle rearing, and the NGOs WWF and Greenpeace 
agree that the main reason attributed to this devastation of rainforest is caused by 
the continuous expansion of soy plantations, which force the cattle farmers to move 
further north (Dros 2004; Greenpeace 2006). For every new hectare of savannah that 
is planted with soy, Dros (2004) estimates that an additional hectare of cattle grazing 
land will be opened up, either in pristine rainforest, or in the transition area between 
savannah and rainforest.
The Amazon rainforest has been the habitat used by indigenous peoples for sev-
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eral thousand years, and served as a refuge during the initial phase of Spanish and 
Portuguese colonization of South America. These people have lived in close and 
sustainable interaction with the ecosystems until present. International agreements, 
such as the UN’s convention on biodiversity, emphasize the unique role of indigenous 
populations and that they may well play a key role in the conservation of biological 
diversity, through their traditional knowledge and practices. These populations, in 
spite of their social fragmentation, have often put up resistance against the economic 
interests, which intends to exploit the rainforest indiscriminately.  The rights of the 
Brazilian indigenous groups are spelt out in several UN-conventions, as well as in 
Brazilian legislation. Yet the actual monitoring and protection of their territories and 
rights have been weak3. Both indigenous groups themselves, as well as NGOs, which 
support them, believe that the REDD system might be a vehicle to strengthen this 
protection, and offering them financial resources at the same time. Indigenous groups, 
whose territories are supposed to cover six percent of the total area reserved for 
REDD projects in Brazil, however, are worried that they will receive low payments 
from programs such as REDD, since compensation levels often are based on previous 
levels of deforestation. The deforestation within indigenous reserves tends to be lower 
than in parks and unprotected areas. The indigenous groups in Brazil have been active 
in demanding that forests should be included under the Kyoto Protocol and that 
their own community projects and natural resource management initiatives should be 
available for payments and credits within Kyoto and other agreements.
3.1.3. Actors involved and implementation of REDD
Indigenous groups
The indigenous people Paiter/Surui live in a demarcated reserve, 7 de Setembro, 
in the state of Rondonia. They were first contacted by the state of Brazil in 1969, 
and in 1983 their present territory was officially demarcated. The reserve at present 
covers 2 480 km2. The reserve was established only after the Suruí took up arms 
against landless peasants, who were invading traditional Surui land in order to find 
land to cultivate. The Surui went through the same ordeal as so many other Amazon 
indigenous groups. The total number of the people within this ethnic group was 
decimated from a population of approximately 5 000 to a mere 290 in just a couple 
of years. Today the Surui have recuperated themselves somewhat and currently num-
ber approximately 1 300 people.4
NGOs
Associação Metareilá do Povo Indígena Suruí
The Surui’s own organisation is ‘Associação Metareilá do Povo Indígena Suruí’. 
The idea to integrate the reserve into a REDD project was taken by the NGO ‘A 
Associação de Defesa Etnoambiental Kanindé’, the most local of the NGOs that 
the Surui work with. This is the first REDD project in Brazil being implemented 
within an indigenous reserve. The official name of the project is ‘Projeto do REDD 
dos Surui’, but the Surui refer to it as the ‘the carbon project’. According to Kanindé 
3  Povos indigenas no Brasil. O Instituto Socioambiental (ISA). http://pib.socioambiental.org/en/c/
terras-indigenas/introducao/o-que-sao-terras-indigenas (2011-08-23) 
4  These figures are built on interviews with the staff of Kanindé and chief Almir-Surui.
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the sum which the Surui will receive through the project will be approximately one 
million US dollar annually.
Kanindé
The NGO Kanindé was formed by a group of people who worked with the indig-
enous group ‘Uru-eu-wau-wau’, who live in the same state as Surui. The majority 
of the staff of Kanindé consists of people who were previously employed by the 
Brazilian governmental agency for the protection of the rights of indigenous people, 
FUNAI. The employees were frustrated with FUNAI and its inability and lack of 
capacity to help and protect the indigenous people in the state of Rondonia against 
intruders.Today Kanindé also includes a wide range of professionals, such as biolo-
gists, agronomists, and social scientists. As previous employees of a governmental 
organisation they are intimately aware of the bureaucratic structure both at federal 
and state level, and are thus highly capable at negotiating, mediating and cooperating 
with federal and state actors. Kanindé can also be regarded as a grassroots organisa-
tion and there are also several young Surui who work in the organisation. The total 
staff amounts to twenty people; ten of them work in the main office, while the oth-
ers are fieldworkers.
Part of Kanindé’s mandate is to identify indigenous groups that have not been con-
tacted and make develop an estimation of the territorial boundaries within which 
these groups move within. Once this has been done they then contact the authori-
ties, in order to safeguard the rights of the newly discovered indigenous group, start a 
negotiation process for the demarcation of their territory and further work on how 
the new territory should be implemented and monitored. So far, Kanindé has helped 
the Surui with mapping out and demarcating their territory, creating different proj-
ects that may help them politically and economically, helping them to negotiate with 
state actors, denouncing intrusion and illegal logging. Kanindé is mainly financed by 
USAID, and also receives financial support from the Swedish branch of Friends of 
the Earth.
In 2007 the Surui succeeded, with the assistance of Kanindé, to prohibit logging 
on their land and they actively denounced transgressions. The loggers, mostly small 
enterprises and small informal groups, reacted with hostility and issued several death 
threats against the leaders of Surui. The chief, Almir-Surui, who is also the director 
of the indigenous organisation ‘Associação Metareilá do Povo Indígena Suruí’, had 
to escape to the United States in 2008, so as not be assassinated, and only recently 
returned to his people. His case demonstrates the real danger of trying to enforce the 
logging prohibition. Kanindé believes that the implementation of the REDD project 
will make it easier to maintain the ban on logging and track down and prosecute 
offenders.
Forest Trends and Katoomba Group
Forest Trends is originally a North American NGO, but has subsequently expanded 
into a transnational NGO by founding and working with NGO in the United 
States, Russia, Brazil, Malaysia, and Canada. In order to create the REDD project 
in Brazil, donors have had to be identified and a project proposals designed. Forest 
Trends, through the Katoomba Group, is an NGO that has conducted the necessary 
market research to address REDD project objectives. It is run by a conglomeration 
of forest business people, forest technicians, development banks, and conservation 
activists. Forest Trends operate in the ecosystem services niche by establishing what 
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the market value of the ecosystem are based on who the sellers and the purchasers 
of these services are. They accomplish this aim by making strategic market analysis, 
finding investors and developing new financial tools to market and sell ecosystem 
services. The REDD projects comprise all their objectives.
Forest Trends has founded a specific transnational NGO, which exclusively works 
with designing and implementation of PES projects, the Katoomba Group. Much 
like its parent organisation, Forest Trends, the Katoomba Group consists of business 
people, forest experts, environmental experts, and they have been very active in the 
construction of national funds, which are channeled to PES projects. The Group has 
launched a global market information service for ecosystem services, The Ecosystem 
Marketplace5. They offer both tools, experiences and contacts to design and imple-
ment PES projects, and their donors include the World Bank, the financial corpora-
tion Citigroup, the Ford Foundation and UNDP.
Both Forest Trends and the Katoomba Group play central roles in the Suruí’s strug-
gle to certify their land as a REDD project and receive economic compensation, as 
they provide technical support in formulating and implementing the project, legal 
advice, training in payment for ecosystem services and contacts with investors.
The Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (Funbio)
Another NGO, which has been active in creating a REDD project at the reserve 
7 de Setembro is the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (Funbio). Funbio’s speciality is to 
offer expertise on how resources shall be accumulated, saved and distributed to the 
final recipients, and, not least, to offer financial resources. Its board members include 
governmental representatives, business people and researchers. It currently supports 
99 projects and it received approximately 10 billion US dollars in 2009 to be rechan-
neled to different projects.6
O Instituto de Conservação e DesenvolvimentoSustentável do Amazonas (Idesam)
Idesam is a local environmental NGO based in the Amazon region of Brazil. Idesam 
is involved in examining and establishing how the REDD program should be 
administered on a daily basis, after the project has been implemented. It specifically 
focuses on the technical aspects of sequestration. Idesam was founded in 2004, by 
a number of environmental activists, and cooperates with the Katoomba Group. 
At the core of Idesam´s work they offer local know-how and perspective to both 
Katoomba and Forest Trends, regarding the Suruí REDD project.
Equipe de Conservação da Amazônia (ACT)
ACT is another local NGO  involved in the creation of the Surui REDD project. 
This NGO is responsible for making an anthropological assessment of Surui’s social 
organisation and culture, so as to be able to inform how the REDD project should 
be designed, and how the resources are to be used from a social and cultural per-
spective. It will also be responsible for the analysis of the Geographical Information 
System data, which will be used to monitor and assess the project.
This REDD project will be especially carefully monitored because the intention is 
5 www.ecosystemmarketplace.com
6  http://www.site.funbio.org.br/teste_en/Portals/0/RA2009_funbio_nav_eng.pdf
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that it shall function as a pilot project for other REDD projects focused on indig-
enous reserves in the Amazon region.
3.1.4. Discussion
The Brazilian case demonstrates several of the unintended consequences of REDD, 
both positive and negative, which occur in local contexts. REDD projects are 
designed to achieve a reduction of green house gas emissions on a global scale, pri-
marily through stopping the logging of forested areas. The local people are a tool to 
achieve this global objective, but these projects have very limited social aims. 
The principal lesson learned from this case is that there is a widespread and compli-
cated entanglement of organisations and other collective actors, who are involved in 
all stages of the REDD project, and their impact on local decision-making processes. 
The logging in the Amazon rainforest has several negative consequences. The fertility of the land decreases, 
and the erosion and the risk of forest fires increase dramatically.   
Photographer: Lennart Kjörling.
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It also demonstrates the relative potential of how groups, whose territories face 
the threat of continuous destruction or degradation, may utilize REDD projects 
so as to counteract these negative processes. It is hard to say how this complicated 
web of donors and administrators can align or fit into the Surui’s own leadership 
system. This a traditional system that consists of a local form of parliament, a council 
of elders, and the indigenous organisation ‘AssociaçãoMetareilá do Povo Indígena 
Suruí’, mentioned above. However, the different clans of Surui, who are gathered in 
the indigenous parliament, have agreed to accept the REDD project.
Internal strife which might be mitigated by the REDD project
There is a certain resistance towards the ban on logging among some of the Surui. 
Several Surui have been persuaded by loggers to sell trees, and do not see any reasons 
to prohibit logging altogether. The leader Almir-Surui argues that the participa-
tion of external actors, such as the NGOs, contributes to mitigate this resistance by 
making monitoring processes transparent and further isolating the dissidents. It is 
however, important that the financial resources reach the people as fast as possible, 
without unnecessary bureaucratic delay, so that they won’t regard the REDD project 
as a negative process7.
The financial resources attract numerous external actors
The large amounts of financial resources, which are brought about by the REDD 
projects, tend to attract a wide array of actors, who claim that they can be in charge 
of specific niches and tasks that are entailed in the implementation of the REDD 
project. The Suruí REDD project also demonstrates the interconnectedness of the 
NGO’s that are involved, forming a network that ties the most local and transna-
tional levels together. This network defies a classic center-periphery image, where 
global decisions are distributed top-down, turning the actual target groups of the 
projects into mere proxies. 
REDD’s potential power as a monitoring mechanism
Indigenous and social groups who try to hinder loggers, and/or stop other groups 
from logging trees within their territories, and stop other forms of exploitation of their 
land and water sheds, continue to face oppression and targeted assassinations, despite 
the federal government’s attempts to create a democratic system with specified and 
allocated rights. These forms of exploitation of the Amazon rainforest are often sup-
ported by local political power-holders. REDD constitutes a vehicle to counteract the 
groups who exercise and support the economic exploitation of areas of rainforest. The 
plethora of NGOs and their interconnection to a transnational environmental political 
field contribute to strengthen the economic and political agency of oppressed local 
groups. At the same time the participation and influence of NGOs on all levels, create 
a lack of representative and transparent democracy concerning both the implementa-
tion and running of the REDD project. It would be hard for any local actor to get an 
overview of the planning and decision processes; for indigenous people who occupy a 
marginal political and social position in the Brazilian society it will be extremely diffi-
cult. NGOs might help indigenous inquirers trying to understand the REDD process, 
but these NGOs are not impartial observers, but active stakeholders.
7 This argument was brought forth by several indigenous Surui people.
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3.2. Peru
Author:	Kristina	Marquardt
The Peru case focuses on forms of speeding up the natural fallow establishment in 
an intensive swidden farming system. Such an adaptive response to the decreased 
possibilities to claim natural forests for agriculture is interesting as a local agricultural 
practice with potential for ecosystem service management of the future agriculture 
landscape in the Amazonian region.
Box 4.  
Information collection for the Peruvian case
The	Peruvian	case	is	based	on	research	made	on	small-scale	intensive	swidden	
farming	systems	in	the	north-western	Amazon	region	San	Martín,	in	the	district	of	
Lamas,	conducted	by	the	author.	The	case	builds	on	two	years	post	doctoral	research	
on	farmers’	intensification	of	the	swidden	farming	system	in	the	region.	The	research	
was	conducted	with	the	local	NGO	Waman	Wasi	and	the	International	Agoforestry	
Centre	(ICRAF).	Fieldwork	was	carried	out	in	11	villages	around	the	city	of	Lamas	with	
small	scale	farmers	belonging	to	the	indigenous	Kechwa-Lamista	people.	The	material	
presented	here	comes	from	a	series	of	workshops	(7)	that	explored	farmers’	view	of	
ecosystem	services	relating	to	soil	fertility	and	a	series	of	in-depth	interviews	(20)	
and	field	walks	(20)	with	farmers	who	have	a	reputation	of	being	particularly	skilful	in	
establishing	improved	fallows,	made	2009-2010.
This	research	has	been	made	in	collaboration	with	the	local	NGO	Waman	Wasi,	which	
works	with	issues	concerning	agro-biodiversity	and	food	security	in	villages	belonging	
to	the	indigenous	Kechwa-Lamistas	group	in	the	Lamas	region.	Waman	Wasi	has	
received	support	from	the	Swedish	Society	for	Nature	Conservation	(SSNC)	during	the	
last	ten	years.
3.2.1. The national context
Box 5.  
Tropical forest and deforestation in Peru
Peru	has	the	fourth	largest	area	of	tropical	forest	in	the	world.	The	Amazon	area	in	Peru	
covers	785	000	km2,	which	corresponds	to	60	percent	of	the	Peruvian	territory.	The	
Peruvian	Amazon	is	divided	into	the	highland	forest	(selva alta)	and	the	lowland	forest	
(selva baja)	(Gazzo	1982).	
The Peruvian government has very ambitious plans to reduce deforestation in the 
Amazon region by working with national parks, indigenous groups, sustainable 
forestry development and eco-tourism, with the help of international funds (WWF 
2009). In the Peruvian Amazon region, the tendency at present is to include almost 
all PES incentives towards preservation of large areas of primary forest as part of 
REDD. 
Although the process of setting up REDD in Peru has been ongoing for more than 
three years, the process has so far not included the participation of indigenous groups 
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and other smallholders, whose livelihood depend significantly on the forest (Che 
Piu and García 2011). The indigenous organisations have accordingly criticized the 
REDD process for not including meaningful consultations with forest communities, 
for whom legal rights to territories is a central aspect, and these organisations argue 
that it is impossible for REDD to separate the unity between Forests–Territories–
Peoples.8  These groups also state that there is currently an exaggeration and mani-
pulation of expectations around REDD, which includes speculation in land, forests, 
carbon capture, and assumed future incomes and this is used to pressure indigenous 
communities to enter into REDD agreements9. Other issues raised in the Peruvian 
REDD debate are based on how to raise REDD to a discussion not only about 
forest conservation, but also about future intensions for Amazonian development. 
Furthermore, the debate examines whether or not regional and local governments 
are prepared to handle social and environmental issues related to natural resource 
extraction, conservation, and the influx of funds. Peru embarked on a substantial 
decentralization process in 2002, transferring more political and fiscal control to sub-
8  See http://www.redd-monitor.org/2011/03/08/aidesep-critique-of-perus-readiness-preparation- 
proposal/ and http://servindi.org/actualidad/44155?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium= 
email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Servindi+%28Servicio+de+Informaci%C3%B3n+Indigena%29
9  See The Peruvian indigenous peoples’ organisation, Inter-Ethnic Association for the Development of 
the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP), detailed analysis of Peru’s Readiness
View of the highly deforestated landscape between Lamas and Bajo Mayo in 2011, San Martín, Peru.  
Photographer: Kristina Marquardt.
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national governments. However, in many cases provincial and district governments 
in areas where REDD funds currently exist, or soon will be, are lacking long-term 
strategic plans and programs with transparency and accountability mechanisms for 
tracking revenues and expenditures. 
3.2.2. Ecological and social background of the area
Box 6. 
Deforestation in San Martín 
Between	1961	-	2005	the	migrant	population	in	San	Martin	increased	from	around	
10	000	to	around	695	000	persons	(INEI	2006).	During	this	time	the	agricultural	area	
in	the	province	has	increased	by	36	percent	(INEI	2007b)	and	18	percent	of	the	natural	
vegetation	has	been	removed	(INEI	2007a).	In	2000,	30	percent	(1	644	577	hectares)	
of	the	San	Martín	region	was	deforested.	It	is	estimated	that	San	Martín	had	the	highest	
deforestation	rate	per	year	in	Peru	between	1985-1990	(INEI	2007a).
The region where this study has been conducted, San Martín, is an area of highland 
forest which covers the hillsides of the Andes where they meet the Amazon forest 
(between 500 - 2000 m.a.s.). The highland forest temperature is slightly cooler and 
not quite as humid as further down in the Amazon basin. Due to its location in-
between two ecological zones, it hosts a rich biodiversity and it is considered a bio-
diversity “hotspot”, which should be prioritized for conservation (Myers et al. 2000).
Fast changing land conditions (see box 8) means that farmers today are experien-
cing real problems of land management. Most of the small-scale farms are operating 
in hilly areas with narrow valleys, where numerous small rivers and streams flow 
down the slopes and into the bigger rivers. The conditions for land management 
can be divided into three ecological zones: (1) farming land relatively close to the 
river bank; (2) farming land higher up the slopes – often very poor in vegetation; 
and (3) areas with some more rainfall and greater access to forested areas. The forest 
frontier is moving further and further away from the area and a large part of the area 
is today established agricultural land (i.e. cropping land and secondary forest fallows 
vegetation) and the shifting cultivation practices is becoming increasingly intensified. 
The period of fallow in the local shifting cultivation system is decreasing and the 
regeneration of fallow vegetation is becoming increasingly problematic. However, the 
local shifting cultivation farmers are entirely dependent on the ecosystem services that 
come about through the regeneration of the forest, i.e. tree fallows that regenerate soil 
fertility during the shifting cultivation cycle, for successful agricultural production.
San Martín has a wide spectrum of land use systems of agricultural land uses:
•	 swidden fields that pass through cycles of field-fallow-field-fallow
•	 multistrata agroforestry systems (mainly shade coffee and cocoa)
•	 long-term monoculture (e.g. oil palm, jatrofa, irrigated rice)
•	 permanent pasture; degraded cropland and degraded pasture (predominance 
of weeds and bushes)
•	 primary forest and mature fallows
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The Kechwa-Lamista (as well as other shifting cultivation farmers) may have a 
combination of land belonging to several different categories and hover periodically 
between annual and perennial crop production and forest fallow, and often have 
holdings in several different areas (see box 7). Most farms are a mosaic of young 
secondary vegetation, fields with annual and perennial production and areas of 
degraded land and sometimes also mature fallow. 
Box 7.  
Example of what a farm might look like
One	of	the	respondents	had	areas	of	mature	fallow,	fields	with	annual	production	
and	inter-sowed	trees	in	different	stages	(to	become	improved	fallow),	a	field	of	the	
perennial	sacha inchic	(inca	peanut)	and	areas	of	degraded	land	around	the	house	in	
the	village.	He	also	used	land	on	relatives’	property	(a	3	hours	walk	distance	from	his	
house)	for	annual	and	plantain	production	in	an	area	where	there	was	still	mature	forest	
available	and	where	production	was	better.
Most	farmers	open	up	their	agricultural	field	in	secondary	forest	(e.g.	a	fallow).	They	
convert	the	forest	to	annual	fields	to	primarily	produce	maize	and	beans.	Between	such	
staple	crops,	in	the	first	year	they	include	upland	rice,	cassava	and	other	local	tubers,	
herbs,	vegetables	and	chili	peppers,	planted	in	smaller	quantities.	The	field	is	then	
enriched	with	plantain	and	other	perennial	crops	over	the	coming	years.	There	is	thus	
a	large	variation	of	crops	during	the	years	the	fallow	vegetation,	before	a	new	clearing,	
but	fallow	periods	between	cropping	are	becoming	shorter.
3.2.3. Actors involved
The state
The Peruvian Ministry of the Environment was created in 2008. The Ministry is 
now responsible for issues of policies and norms related to ecosystem services, and is 
leading the government’s work on national REDD and climate change mitigation 
initiatives. The Ministry has declared a strong interest in promoting REDD pilot 
projects. One of three such pilot projects is found in San Martín. Three REDD 
regional roundtables have been implemented in order to facilitate the regional 
discussions, where of one of those is found in San Martín (founded 2009) where 60 
public organisations participate. The REDD roundtable in San Martín is the round-
table that have made the most progress in developing their REDD project in the 
Peruvian Amazon. So far 35 REDD projects have been initiated, or in pipeline, in 11 
different departments (Che Piu & García, 2011). Currently, there are few on-going 
PES projects in the department of San Martín.
NGOs
The role of NGOs in the Andean and Amazon regions is often complex. NGOs are 
assumed to work for sustainability, participation and efficient development, and, in 
many areas, are also expected to handle roles that were previously handled by the 
state (e.g. rural credit system, extension, research, management of national parks) or 
commercial organisations (e.g. promoting certain crops or products) (Bebbington 
1997). Many NGOs in the area were created when the state failed to carry forward 
alternative development strategies, the market failed to do so as well, and the popular 
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community movements were either too weak or their actions were repressed. The 
NGOs in Peru take on roles of consultant groups, social enterprises and financial 
service institutions in order to bridge a gap between farmers, the state and the mar-
ket, in the absence of domestic, endowed autonomous civil society funding mecha-
nisms (Bebbington 1997). In the work of the REDD round tables, the ideas is that 
participating NGOs should represent the smallholders interests and consequently the 
NGOs will have a crucial role in a future REDD implementation.
Farmers 
The majority are working with shifting cultivation techniques without using any 
pesticides or mineral fertilizers (INEI 1994), and it is primarily the vegetative pro-
cesses that add to the soil fertility. In the study area, it is possible to distinguish three 
(main) categories of smallholders: indigenous farmers from the Kechwa-Lamista 
people; people of mixed indigenous and mestizo origin who have lived in the area 
for several generations, and the recently immigrated colonist farmers (mostly Andean 
people). Indigenous groups in San Martín have not felt that they are represented at 
the REDD roundtables and recently several indigenous organisations jointly have 
established an ‘indigenous roundtable’.
Box 8.  
Small holders in San Martín
The	land	holdings	in	the	Lamas	area	have	decreased	drastically	in	size	during	the	last	
decades	and	the	majority	of	farmers	in	San	Martín	are	small-scale	farmers;	more	than	
50	percent	have	access	to	less	than	ten	hectares	(INEI	1996).	Many	of	the	interviewed	
Kechwa-Lamista	farmers	have	as	little	as	2	hectares	per	family,	and	many	farming	
families	move	their	production,	or	parts	of	the	production,	to	primary	forest	areas	as	an	
accessible	way	to	improve	the	household	situation.
3.2.4. Implementation of improved fallows
The study demonstrated that farmers perceived changes in what ecosystem services 
provide in their production system. By discussing soil quality, crop production 
quantity and quality, burning practices, forest regeneration and farming skills, farmers 
described the ecosystem services that normally support such systems and how they 
are being affected. The farmers talked about production in quantity and quality and 
how these depend on the soil quality, which depends on the kind of vegetation you 
clear for your field. However, mature forest/vegetation/fallow, which is the best kind 
of vegetation to clear for a field, is becoming scarce. Farmers confront these prob-
lems of ecosystem service management in different ways; some, noticing changes in 
their production system due to decreasing natural regeneration of their fallows, i.e. 
when they note the lack of ecosystem services, have started to actively manage their 
ecosystem services with a long-term perspective. Others further speed up the field/
fallow cycle in a short-term perspective. The farmers with a long-term perspective 
on crop production have actively started to sow/plant trees on their crop-land in 
order to ‘create’ improved fallows (see Box 9).
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Box 9.  
The creation of fallows for ecosystem service provision
An	improved	fallow	must	be	planned	from	the	time	the	vegetation	is	first	cleared	to	
create	an	area	for	food	production.	The	field	area	is	cleared,	the	cut	vegetation	is	left	
to	dry	and	the	area	is	then	burned.	Shortly	after	burning,	annual	food	crops,	especially	
maize	and	beans,	are	sown	and	during	the	first	year	the	field	is	also	used	to	produce	
vegetables,	cassava,	cotton,	etc.	As	weeds	start	to	appear,	shoots	from	voluntarily	
germinating	trees	also	appear.	Some	farmers	let	selected	volunteer	shoots	grow	from	
the	first	crop	season	in	the	new	field,	while	others	clear	them	away	during	the	first	
harvest	season	and	only	let	them	grow	when	the	perennial	crop	is	established	and	
dominates	the	field	(two	to	four	years	after	opening	up	the	field).	The	different	tree	
species	allowed	to	establish	in	the	field	are	deliberately	selected	based	on	the	farmers’	
local	knowledge	of	their	properties	and	growth	dynamics.	The	timing	here	is	essential,	
as	the	farmer	does	not	want	to	let	the	trees	become	too	big	in	the	field	too	early,	so	that	
they	inhibit	food	production,	but	also	does	not	want	to	clear	the	tree	seedlings	away	for	
too	long	as	this	would	hinder	enough	shoots	germinating	when	the	time	comes	to	let	
the	field	become	fallow	again.	
Depending	on	the	soil	fertility/degradation	status	of	the	field,	crop	yield	will	decline	
over	time.	Declining	plantain	yield	in	particular	is	observed	and	taken	as	a	sign	of	field	
depletion.	The	plantain	may	produce	two	harvests	in	the	more	depleted	fields,	whereas	
the	fertile	fields	may	produce	up	to	five-six	harvests	of	plantain	or	sometimes	even	
more.	When	the	field	is	later	left	to	become	fallow,	the	fallow	starts	to	thicken.	In	some	
cases	farmers	do	some	maintenance	work	in	the	growing	fallow	and	some	harvesting	
may	still	be	possible	during	this	intermediate	stage	between	field	and	fallow,	as	some	
plantain	varieties,	cassava	and	fruits	continue	to	produce	even	within	vegetation.	The	
fallow	will	grow	until	the	farmer	considers	it	to	be	convenient	to	transform	the	land	
into	a	field	again.	With	improved	fallow,	it	is	very	clear	that	the	kind	of	forest	fallow	the	
farmers	manage	to	nurture	sets	the	stage	for	the	next	production	cycle.
One	of	the	participating	women	expressed	it	thus:	“In	the	same	way	you	have	to	sow	
maize	(in	order	to	make	it	produce),	you	have	to	sow	huabas,	rujindis,	fapina	(N-fixing	
tree	species)	in	order	to	have	a	fallow”	(Farmer	in	Alto	Pucalpillo,	November	2009).
The practice of improved fallows can be seen as a long-term soil management strategy 
and also a strategy to return degraded land to production. The practice is potentially 
interesting for maintaining fertility in already cleared areas, as well as converting grass/
weed/bush land into vegetation with more biomass, which can increase ecosystem 
services. In this particular case the biodiversity of the swidden system should be com-
pared with a grass and shrub landscape and/or a tree succession landscape, rather than 
natural forests. Swidden systems and its secondary vegetation has been shown to be 
more diverse than other land use system, such as commercial agriculture (Padoch et al. 
2007). The farmers in the study actively managed 118 tree species (with the diversity 
on the individual farm varying between 9 and 47 managed tree species). To establish 
an improved fallow, the farmer uses biological diversity in order to increase biomass 
production, and he/she needs detailed ecological knowledge of how to identify and 
manage a diversity of tree species, and a view of field and fallow as a closely integrated 
system that is beneficial for ecosystem service management. Such an understanding of 
the link between food production and vegetation is highly useful in future processes of 
encouraging and developing ecosystem service management in the area.
Agricultural policies in areas where swidden farming is a tradition is often directed 
towards stabilizing agriculture in permanent agroforestry systems, e.g. coffee and 
cacao production in San Martín (e.g. Gobierno Regional de San Martín 2008). 
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However, few farmers would grow only coffee and cocoa, leaving the annual food 
crops used for household subsistence behind (e.g. maize, beans, plantain, cassava) and 
these cannot be produced within the mature cacao or coffee plantation. Therefore, 
the farmer family will open a new field as the canopy encompasses the agroforestry 
system, for producing annual crops. Thus, the agriculture frontier keeps on advanc-
ing into primary and secondary vegetation parallel to the establishment of coffee 
plantations. Another way to approach future sustainable Amazonian farming would 
be to include the diverse and complex characteristics of swidden farming and aim 
for combinations of land use systems, such as permanent agroforestry fields, as well as 
rotational swidden fields with improved fallows.
3.2.5. Discussion
The need to include agricultural land in REDD
Many farming families (indigenous and non-indigenous) in the Amazon region 
find themselves in increasingly harder social economical and ecological conditions. 
In the villages participating in this study, the agricultural frontier has stabilized, and 
agriculture is practiced in geographically steep zones. The period of fallow in the 
Eight years old planted forest (improved fallow) at Don Pedro’s farm in Congompera, Lamas.  
Photographer: Kristina Marquardt.
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local swidden farming system is decreasing and the regeneration of fallow vegetation 
is becoming increasingly problematic. Moving production, or parts of production, 
to primary forest areas is one possible adaptive response to improve the household 
situation. One of the objectives of REDD is to decrease pressure on the primary 
forest areas. In order to reach such goals, small-scale land users’ interaction with dif-
ferent types of landscapes, including agricultural ones, needs to be included in the 
analyses. That would also allow consideration on how existing swidden farming with 
its fallows systems contribute to ecosystem service management, and the possibility 
of including already established agricultural areas in PES programs. Approaching 
deforestation without including agriculture in the analysis, not only as driver but also 
as part of the solutions, will not reflect the reality of livelihoods in the Amazon and 
thereby will have less possibility to succeed.
Agriculture and forestry are often closely interlinked in livelihood systems
In swidden farming, the division between forest- and farming land is blurry over 
time; forest becomes field, but field also becomes forest. Forest vegetation is part 
of the farming system cycle. As part of the production cycle the land is covered by 
perennial vegetation, contributing to biodiversity, generating ecosystem services 
and soil fertility. Practices, such as improved fallows, that can improve the quality 
of the farmland and prolong the time the field can be used, decrease the need for 
the farmer families to move into primary forest areas. Roughly calculated, about 
50 percent of the farms in the study were covered by some kind of fallow vegeta-
tion (less at smaller farms and more at larger farms), which implies that the fallows 
are an important land use category, at the farm level as well as on a regional level. 
Fallows - important land use with potential for ecosystem service 
management
In spite of the large areas in a region, such as San Martín covered by fallow, there 
is little to no attention directed toward fallow and fallow management in future 
scenarios (for example see Gobierno Regional de San Martín 2008). Though 50 
percent of Peruvian CO2 emissions originate from the burning and deforestation 
of forests and other land use changes, mainly from smallholder swidden farming 
(WWF 2009) the agricultural sector is not included in the collaboration plans. 
Many small-scale farmers have detailed knowledge of how to restore degraded  
land areas into secondary forest areas, something these programs could benefit  
from. However, the current situation of REDD negotiations in the Peruvian 
Amazon setting is characterised by growing conflicts of the control over forest 
resources and conflicts of interest between production and conservation in the  
same land use system10.
10  See pagina REDD Peru - No hay Redd+ sin Territorios, Derechos y Autonomía de los Pueblos 
Indígenas
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3.3. Tanzania
Authors:	Linda	Engström	&	Klara	Jacobson
Presented below are two case studies from Tanzania. The PES project presented is a 
REDD pilot project that had been ongoing for one year at the time of data collec-
tion. The alternative ecosystem service management approach is a Community Based 
Forest Management (CBFM) project that had been ongoing for nearly 20 years, 
where communities after a long struggle had managed to get formal ownership of 
the forest resources and management.
3.3.1. The Tanzania PES Case - REDD in Kolo Hills
Box 10. 
Information collection for the REDD study 
The	study,	made	by	the	authors,	is	based	on	interviews	with:
o one	senior	expert	at	Tanzanian	Natural	Resource	Forum	(TNRF)
o the	REDD	coordinator	at	the	African	Wildlife	Foundation	(AWF)
o the	REDD	community	facilitator	at	AWF
o the	Kondoa	district	forest	officer
o the	Kondoa	district	head	of	natural	resource	department.
A	meeting	in	one	of	the	villages	in	Kolo	Hills	provided	information	on	local	perspectives.	
The	meeting	was	called	by	the	AWF	REDD	community	facilitator,	who	also	took	part	in	
the	meeting.	In	the	meeting,	the	chair	and	secretary	of	the	village	council	were	present,	
as	well	as	17	other	members	of	the	council	and	assembly,	out	of	which	three	were	
women.	
A	local	extension	agent	translated	during	the	village	council	meeting	and	provided	
valuable	information	on	the	context.
3.3.2. The national context: REDD
An evaluation report of Participatory Forest Management (PFM)11 in Tanzania 
(Blomley and Iddi 2009) identifies direct causes of deforestation, such as clearing 
for agriculture, overgrazing, charcoal making, persistent reliance on wood fuel for 
energy, lack of land use plans and non-adherence to existing ones. The underlying 
causes of deforestation have been attributed to rapid population growth, poverty 
and policy failure, including lack of financial incentives and government inability of 
effective management. In Tanzania’s Strategic Plan for the forestry sector (2010), one 
of the ways identified for increasing the revenue accrued from natural and cultural 
resources and tourism is to promote ecotourism and “payment for environmental 
services” (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 2010). According to the same 
11  A general umbrella term developed by Tanzanian practitioners that describes different approaches to 
involving community members in the management of forests, both through community management, 
e.g. CBFM, as well as co-management approaches (Blomley and Iddi 2009).
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document, REDD is regarded as a means to “provide economic incentives for stake-
holder involvement in conservation” (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
2010:30).
Box 11.  
Tanzania Forest Facts
Tanzania	has	over	335	000	km2	of	forests	dominated	by	Miombo	woodlands,	and	
species-rich	wooded	savannah	ecosystem.	About	half	is	reserved	forest,	or	proposed	
to	be	reserved,	and	the	remaining	165	000	km2	of	forests	lie	on	village	and	general	
land.	While	most	of	these	unreserved	forests	are	poorly	managed	(partly	due	to	
insecure	tenure),	traditional	and	customary	management	practices	have	supported	the	
conservation	and	maintenance	of	forest	cover	for	sacred,	religious	or	social	purposes	
in	numerous	localities	across	the	country.	Deforestation	was	estimated	at	1.1		percent	
per	year	(approximately	4000	km2)	of	the	country’s	total	forest	area	between	1990	and	
2005.	
Source:	(Blomley	and	Iddi	2009)
There are currently nine pilot cases for REDD in Tanzania. The aim with these pilot 
cases is to gain hands-on experience with REDD, feeding into the National REDD 
Framework and Strategy (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, year unknown). 
Initially, the main actors were NGOs, but increasingly the private sector and uni-
versities showing active interest in getting involved. The REDD pilot cases are all 
financed with bilateral support from Norway through the International Climate and 
Forest Initiative (ICFI) (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, 2010).
Box 12.  
REDD in Tanzania
In	2009,	a	preliminary	National	REDD	Task	Force	was	established	with	the	Institute	for	
Resource	Assessment	(IRA)	at	the	University	of	Dar	es	Salaam	as	the	secretariat.	Today	
it	is	mostly	government	representatives	that	are	included	in	this	task	force,	but	the	plan	
is	that	the	more	permanent	institution	following	the	Task	Force	will	include	sectors	and	
stakeholders	such	as	agriculture,	NGOs,	Forest	Dependent	People‘s	Organisations	
and	the	private	sector.	IRA	will	facilitate	the	consultation	for	the	REDD	Strategy	
process.	In	addition,	the	national	Forestry	and	Beekeeping	policy	explicitly	states	that	
communities	must	be	involved	in	REDD	implementation.
At the time of data collection for this study (February- March 2011) it was not yet 
clear, even at National government level, who the buyers of the carbon credits would 
be, or at what level the money would enter. Civil society organisations emphasised 
the need to connect villagers that implement REDD directly to the carbon market, 
to ensure that they received the money.
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3.3.3. Ecological and social background of the Kolo 
    Hills’ REDD project
The Miombo forests in Kolo Hills are located in Kondoa district. The area is charac-
terised by semi-arid to sub-humid conditions with a mean annual rainfall between 
600 and 900 mm. Altitude ranges from 1 650 – 2 000 m above sea level. The area is 
the watershed of Tarangire National Park and has therefore been partly under long 
term protection. The core of the forest is state owned and has been under long term 
protection by the government, other state owned parts of the forest are managed 
through joint forest management (JFM) between local villages and the government. 
In addition some parts of the forest are owned and managed by the communities 
since 1998.  The protected core of the forest is, however, used illegally by local peo-
ple to harvest natural resources, which is an important part of their livelihoods (Blay 
et al. 2004).
Kondoa district has historically suffered from severe erosion problems. A central 
cause of this was the removal of all vegetation 1927-1949, in an attempt by the 
former Tangyanika leadership to eradicate the tsetse flies (Mugasha and Nshubemuki 
1988). Subsequently, many development projects, including projects by the British 
colonial rule and later the Sida financed HADO project, have addressed these prob-
lems. While erosion was reduced, these initiatives sometimes had devastating social 
consequences locally, for example by displacing people and cattle.  There was little or 
no participation by villagers in planning and implementation (Blay et al. 2004). Local 
natural resource management and agriculture has hence been continuously disrupted 
over a long period and there is widespread skepticism among many villagers against 
new development initiatives.
3.3.4. Actors involved 
The Kolo Hills REDD pilot project is coordinated by the Africa focused interna-
tional NGO African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), with a budget of 2 million USD 
for 3 years. AWF collaborates with the Kondoa district council, which leads the dis-
trict’s forest and land management activities, e.g. community forestry and village land 
use planning. Other partners include:
•	 IRA (Institute for Resource Assessment) – engaged to perform the socio-
economic baseline as well as monitoring.
•	 Selian agricultural research institute – contracted by AWF to provide agricul-
tural extension services to diversify livelihood options, with the aim to relieve 
pressure on the forest.
•	 Camco (the Kenyan branch) – contracted by AWF to perform carbon meas-
urements and marketing.
At AWF, a community facilitator and a project coordinator are employed to work 
with the REDD pilot project. In total, 21 villages are involved in the plans for 
REDD implementation. AWF had worked in four of these villages before the onset 
of the REDD project. During data collection March 2011 there was no contract 
between AWF and the villages in Kolo Hills regarding their collaboration in REDD. 
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3.3.5. Implementation of REDD in Kolo Hills
The REDD pilot project started with the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) 
managing to secure funding from Norway to implement a REDD pilot case in 
Tanzania. AWF selected the areas where they wanted to implement their case and 
then contacted local government and villages. Poverty reduction is an important 
objective for the Norwegian ICFI, alongside goals for mitigation of climate change 
and sustainability (Norad, 2010). However, one primary aim of AWF, being a wildlife 
organisation, was the observed potential to improve the conservation of Kolo Hills 
forest area and to secure a constant flow of water to Tarangire National Park, which 
is a regionally important area for wildlife management. AWF was concerned that 
local over extraction of forest resources caused degradation. They saw an opportunity 
to use the REDD initiative to increase forest protection.
Village council meeting in Kolo Hills.  
Photographer: Linda Engström.
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There are 56 000 hectares of forest in the area included in protection under REDD. 
This includes 22 000 hectares of planned conserved forest, a reference area and a 
leakage belt (meaning an area that allows some “movement” of the use of the forest 
due to restrictions within the conserved forest). Parts of this forest has been under 
long term protection, but this protection has been poorly enforced and villagers 
have been using the forest and extracted resources for their livelihoods to an extent 
that the conservation regulation would not permit. Under the REDD initiative 
AWF sees a chance to extend the protection of the forest area and to better ensure 
that it is not being violated locally. The forest currently plays an important role for 
local people’s livelihoods. Cattle are grazed mainly in the forest due to lack of other 
available land for grazing. In addition, a range of other ecosystem services in the 
forests are used by villagers including timber, firewood, water, poles for construc-
tion, stones for construction, sand, and grass for roofing. With the implementation 
of REDD, the use of these natural resources would be highly restricted.
In the beginning of the project, the Kenyan company Camco performed baseline 
measurement of carbon in the targeted forest areas. This was done without any local 
engagement.The reference areas were selected by GPS, and the intention was to 
later use satellite images to identify changes in forest cover. This was initially done 
without local participation. The idea was that selected villagers at a later stage would 
be trained to do the measurement of carbon and a selected number of individuals 
would then be told the measurement plots.
When the REDD project was presented to the villagers by AWF, they were told that 
they would receive money from the project if they refrained from using the forest in 
the ways they used to. The monetary compensation induced the local acceptance of 
the project.
Both in earlier discussions with AWF, and at the meeting we attended, people 
expressed concerns regarding how they would sustain their livelihoods without 
using the forest, if alternative ways of securing a livelihood were not provided. 
Despite the fact that AWF had been involved in the villages for one year, villa-
gers were still not clear on which resources they could and could not use in the 
forest under the REDD regime. In addition, the provision of agricultural exten-
sion services to improve agricultural production, and thereby provide alternatives 
for villagers to the extraction of forest resources, had not yet been initiated and 
the timeline for this had not been clearly communicated to the villagers. The 
socio-economic baseline survey and feasibility study to map current use of forest 
products and to see what people needed to secure their livelihoods in the absence 
of some forest products had been done after the conservation practices were 
established. Furthermore, while it had become clear to AWF during the designing 
of the land management plans that there was no available land in the villages for 
grazing outside the forest, this had not been solved, but people were still pre-
vented from grazing in large parts of the forest area. AWF had contracted Selian 
Agricultural Institute to provide extension services and help people diversify their 
livelihoods. The contract, however, was signed after restrictions on forest use under 
REDD had already been implemented. After one year of engagement of REDD, 
people had not yet experienced any help with agricultural extension services and 
livleihood diversification.
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In the words of the village chairman:
 “Nothing has started yet. REDD is an initiative from far. It is not our initia-
tive”.
While the AWF staff held regular meetings with village councils and village assem-
blies in the targeted villages they had not been able to make local people engaged. 
As a measure for resolving the problem of people not showing up at meetings, AWF 
started paying people for attending. This approach was seen as highly controversial by 
other actors with knowledge in community based management projects. Moreover, 
the approach by AWF to engage people by telling them that they would receive 
money in the future for selling carbon credits is highly questionable since it is not 
clear at this stage to what extent the money for REDD would actually reach local 
people. Even if money would reach villagers through a trickle down process, which 
was in itself highly questioned by many actors, there were other issues that could still 
reduce the money reaching local people. For example, according to AWF, if the forest 
protection under REDD would lead to increased pressure on other forests (i.e. that 
villagers would start extracting products from nearby forests when being excluded 
from the local forest), so called leakage with REDD terminology. The cost of this 
‘leakage’ would be deducted from the carbon profit to villagers. The hitherto lack of 
support for alternative livelihood strategies makes it likely that this kind of leakage 
would occur. Indeed this was what AWF claimed to have happened in nearby areas 
when people had been engaged in CBFM projects which increased the degree of 
protection for surrounding forests.
3.3.6. Discussion
Even though the REDD project in Kolo Hills had only been ongoing for one year, 
and acknowledging that initiating projects like this takes time, we have singled out 
a few factors that we found unclear when it comes to the future possibilities for this 
particular REDD project to contribute to improved livelihoods and poverty reduc-
tion, as well as some general challenges for implementing REDD. 
Lack of local participation
One underlying and critical factor mainstreamed in all points below is that the 
project does not seem to have its take off point in the local perspectives. As presented 
above, there are many signs of this, and subsequent symptoms such as lack of local 
ownership and engagement, which for example results in AWF paying villagers to 
engage in meetings about REDD.
Forest conservation as a primary focus
AWF has had its primary focus on forest conservation, while engagement, and pos-
sibly experience and knowledge, to achieve development through participation and 
dialogue with local people, have been lagging behind. Conservation goals are com-
municated by AWF as being in opposition to extraction of subsistence forest prod-
ucts and use of other ecosystem services. This is clear in the way the REDD project 
was presented by AWF to villagers:  if they would not use the forest they would get 
money from the REDD project.  The fact that the problem with lack of grazing land 
had not been solved also shows a lack of understanding for the needs of local people 
to use their local environment for their livelihoods.
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Forest conservation kept separate from agricultural development
While AWF planned to provide support for essential alternative livelihoods, they had 
not ensured that this was in place before they implemented restrictions on local forest 
use. The planned agricultural extension services had, for example, not yet been initi-
ated. The villagers were not even clear about if, in what way, or when, they would get 
access to these services. Despite the fact that villagers raised many critical questions in 
the process regarding compensation when not being allowed to extract forest prod-
ucts as before, these had not been answered by AWF in a satisfying way. 
REDD – a challenge to communicate
The way the villagers describe how they understand REDD, how the carbon will 
be measured etc, shows the complexity of this global “initiative from far”, and how 
it creates challenges to communicate it and to build a sense of local ownership and 
control, leading to engagement. 
Failure in REDD planning?
AWF’s way to engage in the REDD project is questionable from a social sustainability 
and poverty reduction perspective. It also casts doubts on the process in Tanzania for 
selecting future areas to be targeted by REDD.  The current approach where NGOs 
get funding for performing REDD projects without a functioning plan for how local 
participation and poverty reduction is to be handled has opened up for these prob-
lematic initiatives. This might be a result of the relatively fast implementation rate of 
these projects. 
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3.3.7. The Tanzania alternative ES management  
 approach - community based forest  
 management (CBFM) in Suledo
Box 13.  
Information collection for the Suledo case
The	study,	made	by	the	authors,	is	based	on	the	following	data:
Interviews	made	with:
o staff	at	the	Swedish	consultancy	firm	Orgut	who	organised	Suledo	forest		and	
Land	Management	Programme	(LAMP)
o the	district	forest	officer	in	Kiteto
o the	forest	manager	for	Suledo
o the	secretary	for	Suledo	Zonal	Environmental	Committee	(ZEC).
A	two	day	visit	to	villages	engaged	in	Suledo	and	LAMP	provided	information	on	the	
local	context.	This	included	brief	visits	to	several	forest	areas	within	Suledo,	including	
areas	that	had	recently	been	selectively	harvested	and	interviews	with	four	families	
(of	which	two	were	longer	interviews)	in	one	of	the	villages.	Mainly	male	farmers	were	
interviewed,	but	on	two	occasions	wives	were	present	and	answered	questions.	The	
farmers	interviewed	in	the	two	longer	interviews	had	been	and	were	highly	engaged	in	
farming	and	had	had	much	contact	with	agricultural	extension	services	as	well	as	with	
the	Suledo	project.
The	former	forester	for	Suledo	was	our	interpreter	and	provided	valuable	information	
about	the	context.
Review	of	Orgut	publications	on	Suledo	and	LAMP,	and	studies	on	Tanzanian	
legislation	and	Strategic	Plans,	complemented	the	interview	information.
3.3.8. The national context: Community based forest  
 management  
Community based forest management (CBFM) was initiated in Tanzania in the 
early 1990s in the Babati district. At that stage, the national forest law did not allow 
communities to manage and own forests and the CBFM was a reaction against the 
restricted access to forests under state ownership (Blomley and Iddi 2009).
The management of the Suledo forest by local communities also commenced in the 
early 1990s, and was made possible by using existing land and government laws to 
develop bylaws which facilitated the practice. By demonstrating positive impacts on 
the ground in terms of forest restoration, the experiences of the Babati and Suledo 
forests (and others in central and northern Tanzania) were used to influence and 
inform the development of the Forest Policy (1998), which in turn fed into the for-
mulation of the Forest Act (Blomley and Iddi 2009). 
Today, Tanzania is considered to have one of the strongest local institutional frame-
works for community-based natural resource management in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Blomley and Iddi 2009). Key legal and policy instruments provide the legal basis for 
villages to identify, declare, own and manage forest resources on village land in ways 
that are both sustainable and profitable. Participatory Forest Management (PFM, 
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including CBFM) is either being established or operational in over 2,300 villages, 
covering over 40 000 km2 of forest land (ibid). 
However, despite its progressive policy framework, Tanzania’s overall performance in 
forest governance is still relatively weak (Kilahama 2010) and local people often get 
less possibilities for local management than the law provides. Laws and regulations 
are further constrained by the possibility in the law for government to overrun local 
management and ownership in case of public interest or if “development” of the 
locally managed land is not taking place.The legislation can also at times be contra-
dictive.
3.3.9. Ecological and social background of the area
The dry, semi arid area where the Suledo project has been implemented harnesses 
species rich Miombo forests. The forest has traditionally been used by Maasai pas-
toralist communities for grazing. During the past decades, there has been immigra-
tion into the area from more densely populated districts, and forest land has been 
occupied and used for swidden agriculture. Lack of local land management plans and 
corruption in village leadership has allowed for this to take place to an extent that 
The conflicts between pastoralist maasai people and resident farmers was one of the reasons why Suledo was 
initiated.  
Photographer: Linda Engström.
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has been detrimental to the local forests. A common problem which still exists today 
is that Maasai grazing land is taken over by immigrating smallholder farmers, while 
the Maasai are grazing their cattle elsewhere during the dry season. The history of 
immigration has created conflicts in the area, mainly between pastoralists and farm-
ers, and it has also caused large scale deforestation (Sjöholm and Luono, 2003).
A survey carried out in 1994 pointed out that pastoralists were on the losing end. 
While pastoralists were dependent on the forest as an important resource for grazing, 
the farmers continued clearing the forest to open up new fields. Due to the increas-
ing deforestation in the area, a national process was initiated to declare the forest area 
as a central government reserve. It was at this stage that Suledo was initiated by the 
Swedish consultancy firm Orgut (with financial support from Sida), as a counter-
action to this national process, as well as a response to long standing land conflicts. 
Orgut aimed at establishing a CBFM where the forest was to be managed, owned 
and protected by the villages surrounding and using the forest area.
3.3.10. Actors involved
The Suledo forest project has been initiated and coordinated by Orgut and 
implemented through district councils and lower level government authorities 
in the Kiteto district, with financial support from Sida, since the onset in1993. 
There are 30 000 people in ten villages inhabited by both smallholder farmers and 
Maasai pastoralists, organized around the 170 000 hectare Suledo Miombo forest. 
Environmental committees with responsibility to manage the forests have been 
formed at sub-village, village and zonal level (ZEC). ZEC has been formed by mem-
bership of three representatives from each village. 
3.3.11. Implementation of Suledo/LAMP
In 1997, the Land Management Programme (LAMP) started in the Kiteto District. 
Since then, these two initiatives, LAMP and Suledo, have been strongly interlinked. 
The communities have been provided with directed measures of support throughout 
this period of time, with the aim to build local capacity and long term sustainability. 
For example, villagers have been trained in knowing and implementing their legal 
rights to their natural resources. They have also been given financial management 
training and legal assistance in negotiations with local and national government 
officials and harvesting companies. The training has to a large extent been carried 
out by local experts. Those who have received training have in turn trained others. 
In this way, the costs for Suledo have been kept to a minimum and local capacity has 
been strengthened. 
With the long term aim to enable local and sustainable management of the Suledo 
forests, the villages have received support in the long process of demarcating land 
and obtaining a Village Land Forest Reserve title (obtained in 1997 but not gazetted 
until 2007). At the outset of the project, a land use planning exercise was undertaken 
in each village, where an area of forest was set aside for each village and local bylaws 
were enacted to protect the forest, generate income, harvest and issue permits and 
fines. The forest itself was then divided into three zones – grazing zone (80 percent), 
agriculture expansion zone (5 percent) and totally protected forest zone (15 percent). 
The primary focus was put on grazing since it was the greatest incentive for local 
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participation (Sjöholm and Luono, 2003). In the beginning there were strong restric-
tions regarding what the villagers could extract from the forest, these restrictions 
have been eased as forest quality has improved. The initial restrictions were made 
possible since LAMP simultaneously provided possibilities to intensify agricultural 
practices in an ecologically sustainable way, providing alternative livelihoods. 
Land management within Suledo/LAMP has focused on supporting different land 
uses needed for a sustainable land management – i.e. of the forest, as well as for 
agricultural practices. LAMP has introduced agricultural extension services adjusted 
to local needs and possibilities. An important concept in LAMP was the practice of 
arranging field visits with other smallholders in more intensive agricultural systems 
in the region as a way of introducing more intensive and soil conserving practices 
that were adapted to local social and ecological systems. Through these field visits 
some farmers had for example adopted terracing and agroforestry to reduce soil  
erosion. 
Villagers used the forest, and still use it, for grazing, collection of fire wood, fruits, 
medicine etc. During interviews the villagers expressed how the improved condition 
of the forests had benefitted their livelihoods. For example, several villagers perceived 
that there was more rain, and that there were sufficient amounts of fire wood and 
grazing in the forest. People also stated that there were fewer conflicts since there 
was enough grazing for everyone. Some villagers also highlighted the increased 
water availability and quality, although the women interviewed affirmed that water 
collection still is a heavy task. 
In 2010, the forests were rehabilitated to an extent that made it possible to start 
logging trees selectively. The tender process to select a local forest company and a 
local saw mill took a long time, since it was aiming at finding companies willing 
and able to be transparent, produce harvesting plans and budgets, etc. However, the 
company selected eventually saw the benefits from this arrangement. The villages are 
now starting to make money from timber sales. Two species are harvested: ntondoro 
(Jubernadia globiflora) and msane (Brachystegia microphyla). The villagers estimated to 
be paid Tsh 120 000/m3 dollar for the first harvest, according to national standards. 
However, due to suboptimal timber quality only Tsh 66 000/ m3 was paid for the 
2010 harvest. The profit went to ZEC and was evenly distributed to the village 
councils, despite the fact that different villages own different amount of land within 
the forest. One purpose of this was to create acceptance of the forest conservation 
measures in all the villages using the forest resources, and thereby reducing illegal 
entrances into the forest. The money received by village councils from the harvests 
were used in accordance with a decision made at the village assembly, following a 
proposal made by the council. In Sunya village, the profit from 2010 was approxi-
mately 1 million TSh (5000 SEK) and it was used to pay for new school desks in the 
village school.
Some events presented to us showed that the management set up had good potential 
to work in a transparent and accountable manner and villagers were able to take 
action against management problems. For example, the former financial manager, 
who was recruited from outside the villages, was fired after problems arose with 
the finances. The new financial manager was recruited from within the villages and 
was previous a member of ZEC. She was trained by an independent national NGO 
before she became manager.  Villagers believed that the recruitment of a local vil-
lager for the job would reduce the risks of corruption.
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3.3.12. Discussion
The long term capacity building in Suledo has clearly increased the level of aware-
ness within the participating villages regarding their rights to resources, business 
management and their responsibilities as forest managers. However, in some situ-
ations, e.g. in negotiations with the private sector, they still express the need for 
external support, and there are still challenges remaining to be solved. Nevertheless, 
in many ways, the Suledo/ LAMP case shows many positive results.  Apart from the 
overarching aim of building a local transparent organisation for a better forest man-
agement, there seems to be fewer conflicts over grazing land, more fire wood in the 
forests, income from timber harvesting, more precipitation and easier access to water. 
Key success factors include:
Local livelihoods in the centre of forest management
The Suledo project has worked with the understanding that local natural resource 
use is a central part of local livelihoods and that local people will benefit when 
conserving these resources, but that local ownership has to be strong to provide long 
term sustainability and acceptance. 
Forestry and agriculture are interlinked
The Suledo project departed from the idea that it is possible to make local people 
interested in conserving forest, but that this must be done alongside with providing 
alternative livelihood options. The collaboration with LAMP, providing important 
extension services adjusted to local conditions and needs, has been crucial for the 
acceptance of local communities for restricted use of the forest. The benefits for 
agriculture from improved forest management are now starting to show.
Building on existing local institutions and knowledge
Orgut worked with existing local institutions, built on existing local knowledge, and 
used local government laws. We see this as a key reason for the success in developing 
and sustaining Suledo.
Long term commitment
The approach to give selected measures of support during a long period of time has 
also been important, not least since many processes take a long time, such as capacity 
building, implementation of new agricultural practices, obtaining legal titles to land 
as well as a continuing dialogue with the private sector and government officials.
The profits made by villagers from the harvesting is an example of how local com-
munities which are already managing ecosystems and benefitting from them for 
their livelihoods, can also profit monetarily. However, the new situation where the 
Suledo villages will be able to extract substantial amounts of money from harvesting 
timber will be a test of the local capacity to negotiate with the private sector and 
government and to hold back corruption. The increasing abundance of wildlife in 
the forests is also contributing to enhanced external pressure, not least because own-
ership of forests and wildlife is subject to conflicting legislation. Other challenges can 
be found in the retention of capacity in managing the conservation and harvesting 
procedures, and withstanding corruption as donor support is withdrawn or reduced.
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3.4. Vietnam
Author:	Malin	Beckman	
Written	in	collaboration	with	Hoang	Minh	Ha,	Tran	Duc	Luan	and	
Hoang	Thi	Sen	at	ICRAF	Hanoi.
The Vietnamese case study looks at two cases in Vietnam. The first is an account of a 
government trial of PES in the Lam Dong province in southern Vietnam, as part of 
the national PES piloting program 2008-2011. Payments are mobilized from state-
owned companies to pay the Forest Management Boards and Forest Enterprises, 
who in turn contract the farmers to protect the forest. The second case is an account 
of a community in Thua Thien Hue province, central Vietnam, which previously had 
its livelihood based on the forest, through hunting, gathering and shifting cultivation. 
Now it is settled with fixed cultivation and increasingly closed off from access to the 
forest, without PES. We look at their perceptions of risks, opportunities and visions 
of a forest based livelihood. 
3.4.1. The national context
Between the 1940s and early 1990s the forest cover in Vietnam decreased from 45 
percent to 28 percent, due to the war and logging. Since the early 1990s there has 
been great attention by the Vietnamese government, donors and NGOs to increase 
forest cover in Vietnam, which has been steadily increasing again to around 38 per-
cent. However, the forest that was lost is mostly natural forest, while the forest cover 
that is replacing it is planted forest, with less value for carbon sequestration, biodiver-
sity and other ecosystem services. An important focus of forest policies has been on 
the role of the forests in binding the soil and water and thereby decreasing the risk 
of erosion, landslides and floods during heavy rains, and decreasing the sedimentation 
in lakes and dams. 
The Vietnamese government has launched a series of forest-related support programs 
between the mid1990s and 201012.The programs have paid farmers to plant trees 
and protect the forest. Tree planting contracts have provided income for farmers in 
the short run, but often with unclear benefits and limited rights to the forest in the 
long run (Beckman 2006). Protection arrangements have included the payment to 
some farmers of 3-10 USD/year to patrol the forests and report illegal logging, illegal 
hunting and illegal agricultural cultivation to authorities. Payments have often been 
marginal, in relation to the loss of livelihoods from shifting cultivation and hunting that 
villagers previously have depended on. The fines for breaking forest protection rules 
have, however, had a deterring effect. The PES policies being piloted in recent years do 
not differ significantly in what is required from the households. However, the size of 
payments and frequency of monitoring has increased, as will be discussed below. 
The Vietnamese government wants to avoid dependency on donor funded initiatives, 
and is developing its own policies, and has established a Forest Protection Fund for 
the long-term financing of PES through contributions from a range of actors in 
society who benefit from maintained ecosystem service provision.
12  The programs are named after the number of the government decrees; Program ‘327’ in the mid 
1990’s, followed by program ‘661’ from 1998 to 2010 and recently, the pilot program ‘380’ 2008-2011.
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Box 14. 
Forests and forest policies in Vietnam
o Seventy	percent	of	the	forests	in	Vietnam	are	managed	by	state	forest	
enterprises	or	state	forest	management	boards.
o Community	management	of	forests	has	been	recognized	in	the	legal	
framework	since	the	Land	Law	2003	and	the	Forest	Protection	and	
Development	Law	2004.
o Government	pilot	program	for	Payment	of	Forestry	Environmental	Services	
(hereafter	referred	to	as	PES)	from	2008.	The	full	implementation	of	PES	in	
the	whole	country	started	in	January	2011.
o Vietnam	is	one	of	nine	countries	identified	for	country	programming	under	the	
UN-REDD	program,	and	is	preparing	for	the	introduction	of	REDD	schemes,	
as	well	as	one	of	fourteen	countries	under	the	World	Bank’s	Forest	Carbon	
Partnership	Facility	(FCFP).
View of the landscape around the Lieng Bong Village (Da Nhim Commune, Lac Duong district, Lam Dong 
province).  
Photographer: Tran Duc Luan.
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The reforestation policies also have the objective of improving livelihoods and 
reducing poverty for the 25 million people in Vietnam (almost one third of the 
population) who are directly dependent on forests for their livelihoods (Swinkels and 
Turk 2006). Approximately 85 percent of the natural forests are located in areas of 
high poverty.  The piloted PES projects include poverty reduction objectives too and 
give priority to ethnic minority households for protection contracts.
Poverty in Vietnam is unevenly distributed. There is a much higher level of poverty, 
around 40 percent, in the mountainous areas, which are largely populated by ethnic 
minorities (World Bank et al 2003)13. Many of these ethnic minorities have histori-
cally had a livelihood based on shifting cultivation in the forests. Since the 1960s the 
Vietnamese government has had programs to resettle the minorities in the upland 
river valleys, banning shifting cultivation and introducing intensive irrigated rice 
production as an alternative. There have also been several government programs 
focusing on improving the livelihoods of the mountain population14, investing in 
infrastructure like roads, irrigation systems, schools and health care. In this respect 
the livelihoods have been significantly improved. The basic issue of how people can 
make a living is, however, still problematic.
3.4.2. Vietnam PES pilot project, the Da Nhim  
 commune case
Box 15.  
Information collection for the Vietnamese PES study
This	PES	case	is	based	on	a	field	work	report	by	Tran	Đuc	Luan	(2011).	His	fieldwork	
included	interviews	with	representatives	of	concerned	stakeholders	in	the	Lam	Dong	
PES	project	and	30	households	in	Lieng	Bong	village,	Da	Nhim	commune	regarding	
their	experience	of	the	PES	implementation.	Tran	Duc	Luan’s	work	contributes	to	an	
ICRAF	report	from	2011	(Catacutan	et	al.	2011).			
3.4.3. Ecological and social background of the area
Lam Dong Province People’s Committee started a project for implementation of 
the pilot policy of Payment for Forest Environmental Services in the Da Nhim, 
Dai Ninh and Dong Nai watersheds in 2008. After two years of implementation, 
the total area of experimental forest for PES in the province is 2 100 km2, which 
accounts for 35 percent of the forest in the province.
The forest landscape provides benefits in terms of non-timber forest products, tour-
ism, agricultural production, fish farming, exploitation of hydropower, water supply, 
watershed protection, climate regulation, soil erosion protection, etc, for the local 
population as well as for the region of South East Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh City and 
the Mekong River Basin.
13  13 percent of the population of  Vietnam belongs to around 50 ethnic minorities. The level of 
poverty in the low land areas, is around 15 percent.
14  Program ’134’ and ’135’
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Box 16. 
Field site information: Da Nhim commune
o Cil	ethnic	minority	are	89	percent	of	the	population	(in	the	province	as	a	
whole	they	are	12	percent).
o Poverty	level	is	41	percent	(Commune	socio-economic	data	2010).
o The	main	agricultural	crops	are	coffee,	persimmon	and	maize.
o Average	area	of	agriculture	land	is	0.61	hectare	per	household.
Prior to the PES there have been state induced forest protection programs in 
the province, including in Da Nhim commune for a decade, in which the state 
has provided payments to the villagers of the equivalent of 2.5 - 5 USD/year for 
forest protection. The protection contract meant that households would commit 
themselves not to do shifting cultivation, hunting or logging in the forest, and to 
patrol the forest to detect any outsiders cultivating, hunting or logging. The remu-
neration, however, proved to be insufficient to improve people’s life, and forest 
resources continued to be exploited by the communities for their livelihoods.
The current PES project studied by Tran Duc Luan, appears to have been more 
successful. The objective, according to the interviewed households, is “We protect the 
forests to maintain the water and soil”. The state formulates the objective as: “Paying 
households for the provision of services of regulating water supply, providing soil 
conservation, limiting erosion and preventing sedimentation of the lake.”
3.4.4. Actors involved
The forests covered by the Lam Dong project are managed through State Forest 
Management Boards and State Forest Enterprises, who in turn contract nearly 10 
000 households for forest protection, of which around 70 percent are ethnic minor-
ity households.
Box 17. 
The Lam Dong PES project
o Funds	for	PES	are	contributed	by:	the	Nhim	and	Dai	Ninh	hydropower	
companies,	the	Saigon	Water	Supply	Company	(SAWACO),	ten	other	water	
supply	institutions,	and	fourteen	small	tourist	companies.
o Payments	are	made	to	the	Lam	Dong	Forest	and	Development	Fund.
o The	Fund	contracts	State	Boards	and	Enterprises	involved	in	forest	
management	for	PES.
o The	project	is	administered	by	the	province	Department	of	Agriculture	and	
Rural	Development	(DARD).
DARD also coordinated with Winrock International’s Program on Biodiversity 
Conservation in Asia region (ARBCP), which contributed to the financing and 
implementation of the PES. The Winrock program conducted research to estimate 
the economic value of the ecosystem services provided in the watershed and sup-
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ported the province efforts to raise awareness about conservation of biodiversity 
and environmental values. 
3.4.5. Implementation of PES in the Da Nhim  
    commune case
In Da Nhim commune the forest, which is managed by the State Forest Manage-
ment Board, includes the Bidoup National Park. The regulations for protection are 
similar between the ‘regular’ forest and the National Park. The Da Nhim hydroelec-
tric plant pays money for PES to the Lam Dong Forest Protection and Development 
Fund, which transfers the money to the State Forest Management Board, who in 
turn contracts households in Da Nhim commune for forest protection. The con-
tracted households patrol the forests to discover instances of violation, i.e. illegal 
harvesting of trees or illegal hunting. They report to the district Forest Inspection 
unit, who also monitors their activities together with the Forest Management Board. 
This way of working is not new to the community. Up to 95 percent of participat-
ing households have been involved in the earlier government forest programs. The 
main difference now is that they get twice or three times better pay15 and that there 
are stricter regulations and monitoring of their activities. 
Box 18. 
Da Nhim commune PES contract 2008-2011
o Allocated	forest	land	for	protection:	15	000	hectares.
o Number	of	households:	558.	
o Average	hectares	per	household:	28.	
o Percentage	of	households	having	contracts:	84	percent.
The 16 percent of households who have not received forest contracts are non-
eligible Kinh households, and households who lack labour. The forest area was allo-
cated to larger groups of households, by the State Management Board. These groups 
then divided the forest area equally between households, irrespective of being rich, 
medium or poor. 
The interviewed households claimed to be satisfied with the fact that land was 
allocated equally. However, they were not happy with that the payment was the same 
for different types of forest and irrespective of whether the forest is near or far from 
the household settlement.  In Lieng Bong village, 54 percent of households received 
payment for protecting the forest of the Da Nhim watershed, which is nearby their 
houses, while 46 percent of households protect the forest of Bidoup national park, 
which is far away, requiring more labour efforts for the same payment. 
The two forest areas are also different in terms of the type and amount of forest prod-
ucts that may be extracted for household use. The forest at the head of the watershed 
is pine trees with low biodiversity, while the national park forest has a larger diversity 
15  Under the PES project the farmers received payments of 290,000 VND/ha/year (approx. 15 USD) 
in 2009 and 350,000 VND per ha per year (approx. 18 USD) in 2010.
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both regarding plants and animals. The possibility of collecting minor forest products 
like firewood, forest leaves/vegetables, mushrooms and fish, continued to be important 
for the household food security. From the national park forest they could also collect 
bamboo shoots and honey. Households could clearly indicate which species were 
permitted and not permitted for them to collect. Some household would admit taking 
some prohibited things like retsin from the pine or shooting birds. The households 
estimated the value of NTFPs (non-timber forest products) collected from the forest to 
around 1 million VND per year per household (approximately 50 USD). 
Commitments and regulations in the contract
Responsibilities of households with forest protection contracts include watching out 
for forest fires, protecting and maintaining the status of the forests and forest land. 
This means regular patrolling16 and reporting signs of illegal extraction. Preserving 
the existing status, means preventing land use for agricultural activities, even on 
patches with no forest. 
16  In the rainy season, every household goes to the forest for patrolling about 3 days per month. In 
the dry season, the average is 6 days per month.
Group discussion in Da Nhim commune, Lac Duong district, Lam Dong province.  
Photographer: Tran Duc Luan
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The forest protection staff that was interviewed claimed that in practice the most 
common way of handling households violating the contract was through ‘blame’ in 
front of the village, and with education. However, if someone cuts down red pine 
he/she will be prosecuted, as this is a criminal act. Most households said that the 
PES policy has increased their sense of responsibility. The number of cases of illegal 
exploitation of forest products in the pilot region decreased by 50 percent in 2009, 
as compared with 2008, according to local government and Forest Management 
Boards.
Survey results show that the forest related income (both PES and forest product 
collection) constitutes nearly 50 percent of the total income of households, with an 
even larger percent for the poor households. Households use the money to buy rice, 
fertilizer, clothing and medication treatment. When the income from forest protec-
tion increased threefold with the PES program, households perceived a significant 
improvement in their livelihoods. 
The opportunity cost of their labour time was not perceived as high, as households 
have so little agricultural land and little alternative use for their labour capacity. 
3.4.6. Discussion
No sustainable livelihoods
In general, the way of forest protection is the same before and after the pilot policy 
for PES. Similar to previous policies, the pilot PES policy has emphasized the objec-
tive of poverty reduction, in which the contracted households are selected based on 
poverty criteria and priority for ethnic minorities. This appears to have been fulfilled 
also in practice. 
However, the way of providing households with payment, is like they are being 
employed as forest guards. With PES, the income from such contracts has improved 
substantially. But there is a lack of long term livelihood security as people become 
more and more restricted from using the forest, without the opportunity to maintain 
or strengthen agricultural production or income from NTFP (non-timber forest 
products). Thus, they become more and more dependent on the income from PES 
schemes. The fact that payments for forest protection have been improved with the 
new PES scheme eases the poverty to a certain degree, but does not address the 
long-term problem. People, who have previously made a living from forest products 
and agricultural cultivation in the forest, have lost this source of livelihood and have 
to find alternatives. It is hard to argue that incomes from PES can be long term 
sustainable, since they are small and unlikely to continue ‘forever’. People are locked 
into a livelihood model, which is not sustainable for them. 
PES schemes would need to provide support to improved agricultural practices and 
to develop other alternative livelihood strategies to compensate for their reduced 
livelihood opportunities from the forest. Further, it would be important to include 
costs of foregone income from agriculture cultivation, resulting from forest protec-
tion, into the payment. 
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Top-down decision on regulations
Luan’s study suggests that participation may have improved a little with the new PES 
scheme compared to the previous state forest programs. The sense of local ownership 
of the scheme, however, remains low, as long as management of the forest lies with 
the State Board, and households are mainly contracted and paid. 
Interviewed households were not fully content with the principles of the size and 
distribution of payments. The uniformity of the PES schemes creates problems, 
when the payments are made irrespective of the type of forest. There are tensions 
arising in and between communities, as a result of that the benefits are very different 
depending on the quality of the allocated forest land, the access to and availability of 
NTFPs and access to markets, as well as the distance to the forest that must be pro-
tected. There is a lack of equality in conditions between the contracted households 
in different watersheds, because of different estimations of the environmental services 
provided. This is perceived as unfair by interviewed households.
These impressions are reinforced by the research on the implementation of earlier 
forest protection programs in Lam Dong (Dang Thanh Ha 2009). This shows con-
cerns that the schemes are top-down initiatives with little or no regard for local 
people’s livelihood strategies and needs. The research suggests that more effort would 
need to be invested in capacity building so that the ethnic groups understand their 
rights and obligations and can take an active role in the negotiations and drafting of 
agreements for PES.  
Furthermore, understanding the contribution to ecosystem service management of 
different forest types and different land uses, including agro-forestry systems would 
be needed as a basis for determining land-use strategies and linkage to payment 
level. The monitoring system today is limited to measuring forest cover and tree 
stock, but does not assess changes in access to or the quality/quantity of ecosystem 
services. 
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3.4.7. Vietnam: Alternative approach to ecosystem  
 service management, the Hong Ha commune 
 case
Box 19. 
Information collection for the alternative Vietnamese case
The	data	comes	from	doctoral	fieldwork	in	Hong	Ha	commune	between	2000	and	
2006,	conducted	by	the	chapter’s	first	author.	There	has	been	continuous	contact	
with	the	commune	until	now	(May	2011)	for	development	updates.	The	fieldwork	data	
includes	household	interviews,	group	discussions	with	villagers,	local	organisations,	
commune	and	district	authorities.	The	research	has	been	done	in	collaboration	with	
researchers	at	Hue	University	of	Agriculture	and	Forestry.
3.4.8. Social and ecological background of the area
The commune population in Hong Ha is around 1 200 people (2002), the major 
groups being K’tu and Ta Oi, who have traditionally lived in this area. A small 
percentage are Kinh (the majority in Vietnam), who have moved to the commune 
during the past 20 years. 
Traditionally the people of Hong Ha had shifting cultivation in the forest as the basis 
for their living, cultivating cassava, rice, maize, beans, banana, etc. They would cultivate 
the same plot 2-4 years and then let the forest regenerate for around 15 years. They 
practiced planting in small holes made with a pole – i.e. not ploughing, with selec-
tive weeding in order to avoid soil erosion. They developed local knowledge in for 
example, assessing soil quality and type of soil, suitable for what type of cropping. This 
local knowledge has been studied and documented by Nguyen Xuan Hong (2002). 
Apart from the cultivation they also hunted, collected wild vegetables, medical herbs, 
firewood and construction materials in and from the forest.
In 1976, the Vietnam government organized the settlement of Hong Ha commune 
in the Bo river valley. Shifting cultivation was banned, and hunting and collecting 
wood was regulated and restricted. Gradually the government has invested more and 
more in irrigation systems to make wet rice cultivation possible. The commune land 
area used for agriculture has been heavily reduced in favor of state forest programs, 
and there is now approximately 200 hectares of agriculture land while there is 14 
000 hectares of forest land. However, the livelihoods of many households have con-
tinued to depend on forest resources, like non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and 
returning to old fallows for cultivation, in order to survive.
3.4.9. Implementation of forest protection and forest  
    planting
The forest in the commune is managed by the state Bo River Watershed 
Management Board. Between the 1990s and 2001, the Board organized planting 
large areas of hill land, mainly with acacia, with the dual objectives to increase forest 
cover and improving livelihoods. Agricultural production has to an increasing extent 
Does paying pay off? Paying for ecosystem services and exploring alternative possibilities | 51
been transferred from the hills to the river valleys. During the time of tree planting 
the relation between the Hong Ha commune and the forest Management Board was 
still perceived as beneficial to the households, because they received tree-planting 
contracts, which gave them an income of around 50-100 USD per year for 1-2 
hectares. All households who had enough labour were involved in the tree planting. 
In the disastrous floods of 1999, the commune became harshly aware of how vulner-
able they had become when moving the agricultural production closer to the rivers. 
The flood inundated or destroyed practically all their agriculture land with growing 
crops. In order to solve the immediate food needs people returned to hill land culti-
vation. They did not dare to open up new swidden fields in the forest, and thus only 
used old fields that had not had the possibility to regenerate any fertility. They lacked 
seed for dry land cultivation and thus output was very low. Many of their old seed 
varieties had been lost in the process of trying to transfer to wet land cultivation by 
the river.
The head of the A Luoi district Agriculture Section argued in 2001 that riverbed ero-
sion is a more serious problem in the district than hill land erosion, and that bamboo 
planting along the rivers should be encouraged. According to household interviews, 
the people of Hong Ha commune had been planting bamboo along the river to pro-
tect the riverbanks from erosion during the 1980s. They also used to plant bamboo 
and indigenous forest species for protection of agricultural and residential areas. With 
the transfer of control over forest management to the Bo River Management Board, 
the incentives for community forestry initiatives decreased. There is also increased 
competition over land now when the villagers only have the river valley for cultiva-
tion. The riverbanks are thus still largely without protective bamboo planting.
The Commune People’s Committee has been arguing for the allocation of rights 
over the tree plantations and natural forest to households. The commune also argues 
that households should be allowed to enrich forests with indigenous species, as a lot 
of forest diversity has been lost, partly due to US chemical bombings (‘agent orange’). 
Moreover, they argue that erosion control and watershed protection is workable with 
agro-forestry production on the slopes, hill land gardens, with cash oriented trees (like 
fruit, rubber, cinnamon, etc) and forest trees and bamboo, intercropped with food 
crops on a long-term basis, could combine environmental and livelihood needs. This 
would make use of the available land resources, improve income and food security 
and reduce the risk of flood damage, without compromising environmental protec-
tion. The district government backs up the commune perspective. They are con-
cerned that people will destroy the forest if they do not have enough food or enough 
land for agriculture production. The commune never got any response regarding their 
agro-forestry proposal, but in 2005 the province DARD decided that the forest could 
be harvested if it was replaced with rubber, with an intercropping of cassava or other 
food crops during the first two years. 
There has been a series of efforts by the state to develop profitable export oriented 
crops. In A Luoi district these have included cinnamon and sugarcane (1996-99), 
which failed due to insufficient market. From 2000-2002 the Department for Fixed 
Settlement encouraged production of pineapple and pepper, which have now also 
been more or less been dropped due to low market prices. 2005 all effort was put 
into encouraging rubber production. In June 2005, at least half of all households in 
Hong Ha were planting rubber trees. Inputs for planting are provided as credit in 
kind. Labour costs are paid for but adds to the credit, which is to be paid back by the 
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households as a percentage of the harvest every year, once the trees give harvest after 
7-8 years. According to staff of the Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry, many 
people did not have a clear idea of the credit conditions, and some were not even 
aware that they were meant to pay back the money they received for their labour. 
It is not clear what happens to the credit if the project fails to give the expected 
returns (Beckman 2006).
Households in Hong Ha commune argued that the main way to reduce vulner-
ability is to spread risk. Ways to spread risk include cultivation in different types 
of places, with different risk pictures and cultivation of many different crops. 
Traditionally people have responded to high production risks by not investing so 
much in any one area of production. The present development strategies require 
higher investments (in rice and rubber in the case of Hong Ha), which appears to 
increase the livelihood risks, given the increasing uncertainty and instability of both 
climate and markets.
3.4.10. Discussion
Alienating people from the forests leads to higher risk of poverty
The government reforestation programs in Hong Ha have had the dual focus of 
increasing forest cover and improving livelihoods. These programs have provided 
short-term income from tree planting for households in the mountains/hills, but 
have aggravated the problem of lack of land for food production as well as alienating 
people from access to the forests for their livelihoods. Blockhaus et al. (2001) argue 
that the forestry programs underestimate the needs of land for food production. 
Several other authors argue that lack of access to the forests is a contributing fac-
tor behind the high levels of poverty among ethnic minorities in the mountains in 
Vietnam in general (Nguyen Van Chinh 1999; Sunderlin and Ba 2005; Swinkels and 
Turk 2006).  Limited access to forests also impacts on household capacity to manage 
risk, as forest resources have previously had an important buffer function for moun-
tain households, when coping with crises like floods and drought, as well as market 
stress when prices are low (Beckman 2011).
Unnecessary conflict between forest protection and development
Land use planning categories tend to define land as either agriculture or forest land, 
resulting in missed opportunities for diversification and integrated land use options. 
This results in unnecessary conflicts between environmental objectives (forest cover) 
and livelihood objectives (income and food from agro-forestry). 
Van Noordwijk et al. (2009) argue that it is a misconception that it is only forests 
that can provide the ecosystem services and the watershed functions that we associ-
ate with them. They refer to many examples of watersheds with mosaics of forest 
patches, agro-forestry zones and paddy fields that provide a regular water flow with 
low sediment. Payment for such ecosystem services therefore needs to be considered 
in a wider context than only for forest management entities. They support a focus 
on actual infiltration capacity of the soils, rather than on the forest as a distinct land 
use category (van Noordwijk and Budidarsono 2008; van Noordwijk et al. 2009). 
A FAO/CIFOR study (2005) also points at results that suggest that the forest cover 
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is overrated as a means of reducing flood impacts. They point to the fact that the 
important aspect is ground cover, which could be other types of land use than forest. 
This speaks in favour of more attention to the livelihood conditions of people in 
areas under forest protection.  
3.5. Sweden
Author:	Lennart	Salomonsson
The Swedish case study focuses on farmers’ reflections on the PES schemes of 
the Europe Union (subsidies/support for environmental protection actions), and 
reflections from organic farmers on their organic practises in relations to ecosystem 
services and in relations to the EU’s PES schemes. 
Box 20.  
Information collection and structure for the Sweden cases
This	case	study	is	based	on	semi-structured	interviews	with	four	farmers	in	the	Swedish	
region	Uppland,	conducted	by	the	author	and	Kristina	Marquardt.	It	also	includes	
a	literature	study	on	different	evaluations	of	the	Swedish	implementation	of	the	EU	
subsidies/support	for	‘environmental	protection’	actions	in	agriculture.	In	this	report	we	
refer	to	these	subsidies	as	EU’s	agricultural	payment	for	ecosystem	service	systems	(or	
EU-PES).	
Three	of	the	farms	(all	organic	farmers)	are	situated	in	the	eastern	part	of	Uppland,	and	
have	been	part	of	a	biodiversity	study	(see	Belfrage	et	al.	2005).	Two	of	the	organic	
farms	(farm	1	and	2)	are	classified	as	‘small-scale’,	(operating	30-60	hectars	of	arable	
land)	and	one	of	them	(farm	3)	can	be	classified	as	‘large-scale’	(operating	more	
than	150	hectares	of	arable	land).	All	of	these	farms	apply	what	this	report	terms	as	
‘alternative	strategies	for	ES	provision’,	to	their	organic	farming	practice.	These	farmers	
have	practiced	organic	farming	for	more	than	10	years	and	their	farms	are	all	certified	
organic,	according	to	the	KRAV	certification	(see	www.krav.se).	They	also	receive	EU-
PES	payments.	
The	fourth	farm	is	a	conventional	dairy	farm	that	operates	about	450	hectares	of	
arable	land,	and	is	situated	15	km	east	from	the	city	of	Uppsala.	This	farmer,	has	been	
signed	up	for	another	form	of	certification	that	aims	to	address	‘environmental	friendly	
practices’,	the	‘Swedish	Seal	of	Quality’	(“Svenskt	Sigill”,	see	www.svensktsigill.se)	and	
also	receives	some	EU-PES	payments.
Since	this	study	has	its	main	foundation	in	the	literature	study	of	different	evaluation	of	
EU’s	PES,	the	discussion	is	based	on	reflections	from	the	literature	studies,	organized	
into	thematic	areas,	and	complemented	with	reflections	on	these	thematic	areas	from	
the	interviews	we	conducted	with	the	farmers.	The	intention	with	the	interviews	was	
to	complement	conclusions	from	the	literature,	with	example	situations	from	concrete	
cases,	and	follow	up	on	questions	that	arose	from	the	interviews	concerning	issues	on	
PES	that	have	been	raised	by	the	research	groups	during	PES	literature	studies.
3.5.1. The national context: EU-PES
The Swedish case is part of this study mainly because it represents a PES system that 
has been implemented during a longer period of time, and thus can provide impor-
tant lessons learned. In the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), agriculturally 
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focused subsidies for environmental protection action (here classified as PES) are 
rather important (see more in Box 21).
The combined total EU in subsidies (the SPS and the EU-PES together) given to 
farms in Sweden are a very important part of the farms’ economic viability, often 
amounting up to half of the farmers net income (even if it is just a smaller part of 
the total economical turnover). For the organic farmers, their PES is a more impor-
tant part of their farm economy, compared to the conventional farm (where the PES 
was just a minor part of the income as well as the net income). If more of the SPS 
(Gårdsstöd) is channeled to PES, it also means that PES will be an increasing part of 
Swedish farmers net income, and consequently the incentives to sign up for these 
PES will increase. 
All of the four farmers that participated in this case study had signed up for different 
PES payments, directed towards specific environmental protection actions, and have 
been active in these schemes for many years, but none of them have chosen to re-
sign for some of them (this will be further discussions below).
Box 21.  
EU as part of the EU CAP
A	substantial	part	(23	percent)	of	the	total	EU	budget	is	allocated	to	the	Common	
Agricultural	Policy	(CAP).	Of	the	CAP	budget,	57	percent	is	allocated	for	SPS	(’single	
payment	scheme’,	in	Sweden	called	‘Farm	support’	(Gårdsstöd	in	Swedish)	and	about	
25	percent	goes	to	support	‘Rural	Development	and	Environmental	Protection	activities’	
(‘pillar	II’	in	CAP).	The	SPS	subsidy	is	a	conversion	(from	2003)	from	the	older	
production	subsidy,	and	gives	a	farmer	a	fixed	payment	per	hectare	cultivated	land,	
and	the	support	for	‘Environmental	Protection	activities’,	is	the	EU	payment	to	farmers	
equivalent	to	what	we	in	this	report	have	classified	as	‘Payment	for	Ecosystem	Services’	
(in	this	context	called	EU-PES).	The	discussion	on	the	future	of	agricultural	subsidies	
has	intensified	within	the	EU,	and	a	reformation	of	CAP	will	take	place	in	2013.	In	these	
discussions,	there	is	an	increasing	acceptance	for	an	adjustments	of	resources	within	
the	CAP,	taking	resources	from	SPS	and	to	increase	the	support	to	rural	development	
and	environmental	protection	actions	(Ekman	et	al.	2010).	
For	the	period	2007-2013	the	budget	for	different	environmental	protection	actions	in	
agriculture	(here	classified	as	PES),	is	about	3-3.5	billion	SEK	per	year	(Rabinowicz	
2010).
3.5.2. Ecological and social background of the case area
From an agricultural perspective, the climate conditions are very similar for all 
four of the farms, with a precipitation of about 600 mm per year (with rather large 
annual variations), and a similar crop establishment potential. They also have similar 
soil conditions, where variations probably are larger within each farm than between 
the farms.
The landscape is rather similar on all of the farms, with a mixture of open farm land, 
semi natural grassland, and forested land, with open ditches to provide drainage to 
many of the fields. The organic farms, by their closer connection to the Baltic Sea, 
have more influences from the sea (such as local climate in the spring, autumn and 
winter), and also in respect to potential pollutants from farmland to the Baltic Sea, 
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which is threatened by eutrophication. Generally, the similarities in the landscape 
structures also gives a similar environmental protection demand (and potentials) on 
all farms, but the farming strategies makes the local (farming) landscape vary greatly 
from farm to farm, and also between large-scale and small-scale organic farms (a study 
described in Belfrage et al. 2005). 
3.5.3. Actors involved and implementation
EU-level
In the Swedish agricultural PES, the overall regulations are made up in negotiations 
within the EU commission. Usually, the main work is done by experts who represent 
each member states’ agricultural authority, and finally decided upon, after submission 
for comment from the EU parliament, at a meeting with the Ministries of Agriculture 
from the member states.  These EU regulations address such issues as regulations of 
the values for PES, the main principles for the size of the payment, conditions for 
payment, how payment should be organised, how control of the payment of PES shall 
be organized, etc. At this level, the main influences in the process are coming from 
what happens in the domestic political process in each member state, on one side, 
and on the other side, it is influenced by global trends (especially WTO negotiations), 
In EU´s PES schemes for  ‘environmental protection’, farmers get support for the establishment of buffer zones 
with permanent grass close to water courses.  
Photo: Division of Communication, SLU.
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interpreted by the EU commissionaires and their expert groups. Stakeholders outside 
these decision-making forums (national parliaments, EU Commission and the EU 
parliament) usually act through lobbing in these forums.
The national level
The next level in handling the Swedish agricultural PES, is the Swedish Board of 
Agriculture (SBA). It supports the Swedish Ministry of Rural Affairs with expertise 
for official reports, as basis for Swedish implementation of the EU regulations. SBA 
also administrates the PES, through the County Administrative Boards (Länsstyrelser). 
Stakeholders outside these boards have very little influence on processes within these 
administrative boards. If they want to have an influence, they need to lobby politicians 
in the parliament, or in the government. Stakeholders could argue for the release 
of new official reports (utredningar), based on need for information, or the political 
directive for an already initiated official report. They could also lobby by arguing to 
be a body to which a proposed measure from an official report is submitted for com-
ment (remissinstans). A dominating discourse at these administrative authority/boards 
will have a great impact on final suggestions that will be generated by their official 
reports. The on-farm control and administration actions of the PES are in the hands 
of administrative people at the different County Administrative Boards. Their educa-
tional background and competences, including communication skills and abilities, will 
have some influence on how this control will be handled in the practical contact with 
the farmers, even if the instructions for these administration and control practices are 
increasingly regulated on national level by SBA.
Subsequently, after all policy and regulations have been established, PES are pre-
sented to stakeholders, i.e. farmers, for implementation.  The farmers can volunteer 
and individually sign up for a PES, and usually they have to sign up for the subsidy 
for a period of 5 years. If they, during these five years, do not fulfil the manage-
ment requirement for the PES, they will be obliged to pay back all money received 
for the PES during the whole period. Some ‘cross-over conditions’ have also been 
introduced, saying that you can lose your PES if you do not fulfil environmental 
protection laws concerning other parts of the farm. The combinations of a five-
year long contract, often for management work that can be hard to make realistic 
estimations of, and increasing cross-over conditions, have made many of the PES less 
attractive for farmers to sign up for. If a farmer wants to influence the PES system, 
she/he needs to act through some organisation that can lobby Swedish politicians at 
a higher political level (according to what has been described above).
Box 22.  
The EU-PES applied by the interviewed farmers
The	environmental	protection	schemes	that	was	included	in	the	case	study	was:	
o Organic	farming	(Farm	1-3).
o Semi-natural	grassing	land	(Farm	1-4).
o Pesticide	free	zones	(close	to	rivers,	streams,	and	ditches)	(Farm	4).
o Nitrogen	leakage	protection	(Farm	4).
o Open	landscape	of	small	farmland	(Farm	1	and	2).
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3.5.4. Implementation
Box 23.  
Organic farming and ecosystem services
The	organic	farmers	in	this	study	have	subscribed	to	certified	organic	programs,	
fulfilling	the	certification	for	both	EU	regulations	for	organic	production,	and	the	
Swedish	KRAV	certification	regulations	(which	have	a	more	demanding	regulation	
for	applications	of	organic	farming	principles).	The	organic	farming	principles	have	
intentional	aims	for	ecosystem	services	in:
o Soil	fertility	(by	grassland/ley	in	the	crop-rotation	and	no	pesticide	residues),	
including	carbon	sequestration	(by	increasing	soil	humus	content).
o Pollination	and	biological	control	by	natural	predators	(by	not	using	pesticides	
on	insects).
o Increased	biodiversity	(by	not	using	herbicides	on	weeds,	and	by	a	diverse	
crop	rotation	system).
3.5.5. Discussion
The evaluation of the Swedish ‘Rural Subsidy Scheme’ (Rabinowicz 2010), which 
also include a substantial PES (almost 19 billion SEK over the period 2007-2013,  
53 percent of the total program budget) indicates how this EU subsidy system is 
a result of many different political formulated goals, and implemented as subsidies 
based on expected effects and pragmatic administrative realism in implementation. 
The subsidies in the program are divided into different sub-groups, and sub-sub-
groups to which the PES, “Support to Sustainable Agriculture”, is the largest. 
Hard to evaluate environmental protection effects
The Swedish ‘Rural Subsidy Scheme’ (Rabinowicz 2010), as well as the study by 
Hasund (2009) on the impact of PES for semi-natural grassland, strongly highlighted 
the difficulties of evaluating the real effects of most of the agricultural PES, as they 
are embedded in many different, and sometimes contradictory, agricultural regula-
tions and subsidy systems. Still, they seem to have an increasing significance for some 
environmental landscape elements, Hasund argues (2009), but their economical 
efficiency is hard to estimate. There are many studies, according to Hasund (2009), 
making the same deductions, as the indicated effects diverge greatly between the 
studied samples. There are both samples of very good effects of the PES on the target 
environmental problems, but also examples of contradicting effects, or simply no 
effects at all. 
This is also in line with the interviews we had, where the farmers adapted very little, 
or not at all, to PES schemes, but signed in for the ones that fit their own farming 
system and management planning. They were also discontented with the detailed, 
and de-contextual, regulations and control systems of the different PES, as well as 
the difficulties in finding information on the different kinds of PES and their regula-
tions.
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Important incentive structures?
When comparing the amount of PES to the farm and their net-income, it was clear 
that PES made up a significant part of the organic farmers income, especially for 
the small-scale organic farms (Hasund 2009; Rabinowicz 2010). The PES can in 
that way have a higher significance to the local economy in rural areas, than first 
indicated in comparison to the total economic turnover on a farm. However, it 
also indicates that the food production systems internalize the PES into the food 
production costs and income situation, which means that it lowers the price for the 
harvested agricultural products and makes the end costs higher, especially in relation 
to land prices.
For the interviewed farmers, the total support by PES and ‘farm support’ (SPS), were 
significant and made up 10-30 percent of the total economic turnover, which was 
almost as big as the net-return for the farm. The ‘farm support’ subsidy made up 
the largest part of the received funds and the PES made up only a minor part of the 
income.
Effect on farmers’ attitudes?
The Hasund’s study concludes that PES has an impact on farmers’ knowledge and 
attitudes on environmental issues in agriculture (Hasund 2009:77). The interviewed 
farmers all seem to have been in some way influenced by the EU-PES system and 
in turn this has had an impact on how they think and act on agricultural environ-
mental issues. Especially with respect to the “signals” from society, what it asks for 
concerning ecosystem service management could be of importance, and in that 
way have an impact on how the farmers themselves start to reflect and turning into 
creative problem solvers by taking initiative in improving their systems to address 
on-farm environmental issues. The farmers’ own engagement and interest in envi-
ronmental issues seems to be the driving force for environmental protection actions 
on their farms, and not the potential for obtaining subsidies by PES. An example of 
this was given by the interviewed conventional farmer, who had implemented some 
environmental protection actions (such as buffer zones with permanent grass close 
to creeks/rivers, and pesticide free zones close to water resources and environmen-
tal hot spots) to be certified by the ‘Svenskt Sigill’. He has now left the certification 
system, but still applies the environmental protection actions as they were “environ-
mentally sound and important”, even if it costs him money to do so.
Inflexible and non-contextual adaption can have counter effects and 
reduce socio-economic efficiency
Hasund (2009), Nitsch (2009) and Rabinowicz (2010) all highlight the problems 
with the highly detailed regulations and the inflexibility in applications of the PES, 
and how this can have contradicting results on the aims that are striven for through 
PES.  This was supported by our interviews with the farmers, as they stated that PES 
schemes with detailed regulations, such as how they should be implemented and high 
penalties for non-compliance, made them very unattractive to sign up for. We also saw 
in our interviews the contradictory properties on the existing PES (in line with the 
conclusions from Hasund 2009:82) that the technical focus on the PES has counter 
productive results, as they do not adapt to contextual situations. This exact reason is 
why those farmers interviewed for this study have decided not to renew some of the 
PES projects they previously signed up for, after the first contract period was finished. 
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One example, mentioned by all of the interviewed farmers, is the contradictory 
regulations for caring for semi-natural grazing lands. The farmers get paid for main-
taining traditional pastures open in order to maintain the particular flora diversity in 
these areas. As most of the specific grazing land flora does not grow in shady areas, 
the maintenance is done by letting animals graze the pasture and thus avoid forest 
regeneration. However, the regulation for required grazing intensity in the PES is so 
high that the requested flora does not reach flowering stage.
The importance of the farmers’ own knowledge, initiative and creativity
In both Hasund’s and Nitsch’s evaluation, the importance of farmers own knowledge 
and engagement were discussed.  The three organic farmers interviewed all reflected 
on how a contextually adapted ‘management plan’ could be a much more attractive 
One example mentioned by the farmer as a PES with contradictory regulations was the support for caring for 
semi-natural grazing lands. Hereford cow at Krusenbergs gård, Uppland.  
Photographer: Viktor Wrange, SLU. 
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possibility, it involved the farmers own initiative, creative solutions and local knowl-
edge. One of the farmers also assessed this kind of system in the environmental forest 
certification she is a part of. She highlighted very clearly the difference in attitudes 
from how the control of the certification was implemented, compared to her organic 
certification contracts for the agricultural part. In the forest certification system, the 
person who made the inspection also gave advice, and constructive discussions often 
took place during these farm visits, which was described as very inspiring for her to 
try to develop the ecosystem service support on the farm’s forest systems even more. 
The organic farmers also referred to ‘older’ certification audit strategies, where the 
external auditors also were farm advisors who could discuss and offer insights on how 
to improve the certification practice and also get input of innovative ideas from other 
farmers, delivered by the certification auditor.
All four farmers interviewed had been taking their own initiative to find and partici-
pate in different learning environments for improving farming and to make it more 
sustainable and environmentally friendly. 
Expensive way to support ecosystem services and environmental protection
In a national investigation (SOU 2009) the direct and indirect cost of administration 
of the agricultural PES and the SPS (the ‘Farm Support’) were estimated to about 
500 million SEK per year, or about 10 percent of the total cost for the Swedish 
Agricultural ‘subsidy system’. 
The focus on creating a market based system on quality, that does not have an 
exchange value (in contrast to the PES concept), also creates a huge administrative 
economical transfer system, that needs a similar huge administrative controlling and 
evaluation system, as normal market feedback between producer and consumer 
does not exist. In the evaluation of the PES system, both Hasund (2009) and Nitsch 
(2009), also recommend that the system needs to be re-designed into a more simple 
format, and they ask for new ways to connect farmers and authorities that handle 
the PES, which also should include advising the farmer on what would work and 
not work on specific farms. This was also highlighted by the two small-scale organic 
farmers in our interviews, where they were proposing some kind of farm manage-
ment plan contract, as well as their request for a more constructive dialogue and 
relation with the auditors and the authorities.
Alternative perspectives on securing ecosystem service provision
Many of the landscape structures that now are supported by PES in the Swedish 
application of EU CAP, has in fact been formed by earlier agricultural activities 
(Nitsch 2009; Stenseke 2006). These production systems had production and not 
environmental protection in focus, but was based on local ecosystem services as the 
main input. The high biodiversity in the meadows for example, came out as a ‘by-
product’, while other ecosystem services was consciously supported (as biological 
nitrogen fixation, good soil fertility by high activities of soil organisms, predator sup-
port for insects control in crops).
A final conclusions from the evaluation of the Swedish ‘Rural Subsidy Scheme’ 
(Rabinowicz 2010), is that there is a need for a revised indicators and data set to be 
launched, if a relevant and effective evaluation can be constructed. The evaluation of 
the PES system comes up with suggestions of new biological ‘effect indicators’, PES 
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systems that operate on landscape level, and new contracts model with farmers.
This phenomenon was highlighted and discussed by the small scale organic farmers 
in our interviews, and they addressed a better ‘natural’ integration between produc-
tion and conservation. Below are some of the thoughts shared with us through the 
interviews:
“It would be better that the farmer got paid for the real production cost, 
including environmental consideration actions that would make the product 
more costly”
“It is offensive that peoples can get farmland environmental subsidies without 
producing anything”
“I would prefer an individual ‘management plan’ on farm level, to see how the 
farm could develop its ecosystem service management”
The ‘small-scale’ organic farmers talked about the importance of a knowledgeable 
engaged person that can set aside time for contextual adapted ecosystem service 
supporting actions (or the ‘caring/nursing hand’), which implies needs of labour on 
such a farming system. In connection to this discussion they also highlighted that 
good ecosystem services elaborated on farms could only be implemented on small-
scale farming. In connection to these discussions they also highlighted the very spe-
cial situation with farming as an enterprise, in that biological and ecological changes 
take times, and that ‘good farm practice’ needs to have a long-time perspective (as 
operating with crop-rotation and working with soil fertility improvements). In con-
trast many political decisions on changes in PES regulations are taken in short-term 
perspectives.
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4. Comparative discussion
Our study shows some of the very different contexts in the world into which PES 
projects are now being implemented. It reveals some striking similarities and thereby 
general key factors to consider for a pro-poor development, when PES/REDD 
schemes. are being implemented 
4.1. The contradiction between the overarching PES 
schemes and local contexts 
In this study we discuss PES, and specifically the REDD projects, in terms of their 
character as transnational master plans, which share major objectives and schemes of 
implementation. However, their outcomes are very dependent on local economic, 
political and social contexts. The case studies show that the impacts of the PES proj-
ects vary due to a number of factors:
•	 The political strength and influence of the target group.
•	 The political structure and functioning at state and local level.
•	 The brokers involved in the various processes of implementation of the PES 
projects.
•	 How these brokers interact with the target group, with each other and with 
the state and local political actors.
•	 The economic, social and cultural composition of the target group.
•	 The political decision process within the target group and its economic and 
political links to external actors; and not least the group’s livelihood systems 
and strategies. Yet these intricate structures and interconnections are often 
insufficiently considered when designing PES schemes and projects.
There is risk of a democratic deficit in the PES projects. The complex nature of the 
PES projects and their implicit “initiative from far”, and thus top-down, approach 
demand various forms of expertise; which often are filled by NGOs, acting as bro-
kers between donors, national political actors and the target groups. The Brazilian 
case demonstrates this vividly; it is difficult to have an overview of the political 
implications of the interactions in the entangled web of actors involved in a PES 
project. This has consequences for how actors in the PES projects harmonize with 
the indigenous group’s internal political processes. These political complications are 
not addressed in the PES schemes. On the contrary, the PES projects are often so 
complex that they are almost impossible to implement without the contribution of a 
wide array of brokers/NGOs.
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In the Brazilian case the NGOs may also have important supporting functions for 
the target groups, who are encompassed by a PES project. The political support 
and monitoring may counteract the activities of external groups who try to extract 
natural resources within the target group’s territory. NGOs at local level function as 
whistle-blowers that can alert the international environmental community in case of 
transgressions. The NGOs might also be able to help the target group to better com-
prehend economic and political decision structures and how they are executed.
4.2. Participation and trust in local capacity
The PES case studies in this report show that the smallholders’ participation in the 
formulation of objectives and mechanisms of implementation of the PES has been 
very limited. The case studies furthermore demonstrate the importance of building 
on local capacity, i.e. seeing the local communities as part of the solution and build-
ing on existing knowledge, needs and local institutions. 
The Tanzanian cases, for example, show two contrasting approaches to local engage-
ment. In both cases, the forest ecosystem services are under threat from increased 
human pressure and environmental change. However, in the REDD project, local 
people are seen as the main threat to the forest and the project is based on an atti-
tude that the local people will not understand their own benefit from managing 
the forest. In Suledo, on the other hand, the entry point is that it is possible to make 
local people see the benefit from conserving the forest, but that it must be done 
simultaneously with providing alternative livelihood options, and that local owner-
ship has to be strong so as to provide long term sustainability and acceptance. 
With time, several of the benefits from the forest management are becoming visible 
to the Suledo farmers. Suledo farmers have also had the possibility to strengthen 
their agricultural outputs, e.g. by participating in national workshops and exchanging 
knowledge with farmers in other parts of the country. With the long term com-
mitment in the Suledo-case the implementing NGO has focused on processes that 
provided tools for the local people to independently manage their forests, e.g. by 
training in law, regulation and financial management, as well as strong emphasis on 
building on and strengthening existing local village organisation to become more 
transparent and accountable. In the REDD project, the link between current liveli-
hood strategies and changes under the REDD scheme was unclear, as well as what 
type of compensation local people would receive for not using the forest.
In Sweden, where PES arrangements have been implemented for a long time with 
increasing impact from limiting EU regulations, the development has been pushed in 
a direction of reduced trust in local farmers by the project designers. Discussion and 
advice between authorities and farmers have been replaced by short term relations 
and inspections. Farmers express frustration over this development. 
In Vietnam we see a contrast between, on the one hand, the government PES sys-
tem, which pays the farmers to stay out of the forest, and communities wanting to 
take more responsibility, on the other. In the latter case, the Hong Ha community 
has previously had systems of bamboo planting against erosion. The local system has 
been undermined by the lack of trust from the authorities in the local knowledge 
systems, replacing it with restrictions on access to forest land. The consequence is not 
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only a loss of farmer initiative for provision of ecosystem services, but also problems 
of food insecurity.  The Peru case shows farmers’ own initiative to provide ecosys-
tem service management and increase food production at the same time, without 
incentives from the outside. Good farming practices (such as improved fallows) has a 
potential to provide ecosystem services as positive biproducts.
We argue that it is important that approaches to PES recognise that local com-
munities have the capacity to contribute, that their participation is crucial for 
sustainability, and to show awareness that such learning processes take time. There is 
a need to give attention to how the concept of a PES initiative like REDD can be 
conveyed to the villagers in a comprehensive and meaningful way.  There are several 
examples in the cases presented where villagers express a dissatisfaction with the 
limited way in which they have been involved in setting up the project and/ or lack 
of understanding the reasons for why the REDD project was implemented on their 
land areas. For example, in the Tanzania REDD case there were carbon measure-
ments made by an external actor on secret plots, which would serve as a baseline for 
future payments, without engaging the villagers. Even though the plan is supposed 
to involve some of the villagers later on, the approach made villagers confused and 
alienated.  The concept of carbon trading is an abstract term, which does not make 
sense to most local social groups, thus making it more difficult to achieve the local 
villagers’ understanding and engagement in the project. 
The Brazilian case shows another type of situation where it is difficult for local peo-
ple to get an overview of the project plan, its implementation and levels of negotia-
tion, thus making participation and ownership difficult to achieve. It  
becomes unclear who represents who; who is paid by whom; and what is the agenda 
of different actors? In Peru, indigenous communities regard REDD as a threat to 
land access and land rights and express a dissatisfaction of not being consulted in 
a meaningful way. In Vietnam, top down national forest programs with little or no 
participation processes have been on-going for decades, and PES schemes have so far 
not lead to any radical changes in forest management. Nevertheless, PES incentives 
have the potential to be an opportunity for increased local participation in ecosystem 
service management if the focus is shifted towards ecosystem service provision and 
livelihood strategies as interrelated issues, rather than just paying farmers to patrol 
the forest and report illegal activities.
4.3. Consequences of the conflicting approach for 
production and conservation 
In all cases it can be seen how agricultural and forestry uses compete for the same 
land. This is one of the reasons why a large PES initiative as REDD currently is 
internationally ventured and that several other PES initiatives have been introduced 
in order to ensure the maintenance of ecosystem services from forests. There is often 
a conflictive division between forest and agricultural land, as well as between pro-
duction and conservation, in the PES discourse and debate. We want to question if 
this division is useful for an effective management of ecosystem services.
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A broad livelihood perspective is necessary
In the cases presented, the smallholders have expressed a broad livelihood perspec-
tive when describing how the families use the land to support themselves, including 
components such as food production, cash income, firewood collection, grazing, 
access to medicine and construction material, coming from both forestry and 
agricultural activities. The natural resources and ecosystem services used in all cases 
presented are integrated, and land uses overlap in several ways. For example, in the 
Tanzania-Suledo case cattle is grazing in forests, in the Peru case the farmers regen-
erate forest on agricultural land, and in Vietnam the commune expresses wishes to 
intercrop forest trees with cash crops and food. There is no clear line between forest 
and agriculture, cash and subsistence farming, annual and perennial farming etc. For 
smallholders, it is a constant trade off between conservation and production. Shifting 
cultivation (found in all cases except the Sweden) is one land use system that brings 
this conflict to a head. Shifting cultivation is generally described as a farming system, 
which implies destructive and undesired farming practices that contribute to defor-
estation of tropical forest areas and therefore has to be replaced with other land uses 
(FAO 2001; Meza et al. 2006; Palm et al. 2005). However, looking at shifting cultiva-
tion from another perspective, as in the Peruvian and the Vietnamese cases, shifting 
cultivation can also be viewed as a form of agroforestry in which trees and crops are 
intimately interspersed in time rather than space (Pfund et al. 2011). The potentials 
of shifting cultivation are seldom expressed. It is often more diverse than other farm-
ing systems, and integrating fallow vegetation as part of the farming system cycle 
makes it possible to integrate production and conservation objectives. 
In many REDD projects, carbons sequestration has been interpreted as ‘closing off ’ 
the forests rather than focusing on management models building on the capacity of 
local communities to manage, maintain and develop the ecosystem services which 
they protect. The PES/REDD initiatives that we have studied in Tanzania and 
Vietnam, for example, focus on paying farmers to stay out of the forest. In Brazil the 
indigenous groups live within the forest, but it is unclear what and how much they 
will be able to harvest and extract from the forest. Underlying such an approach of 
‘closed forests’, and the conversion of shifting cultivation into permanent farming 
systems, builds on an implicit view of the forest dependent population as being inca-
pable of managing the forest in a way that is coherent with environmental goals. 
When restricting the smallholders’ access to forest resources, the need arises to 
strengthen other livelihood strategies, including agricultural production. The experi-
ence in Vietnam suggests that the villagers have too little land (0,16 ha per family) to 
make a living from agriculture. In the Hong Ha case this leads to the development 
of intensive agriculture production in the river valleys, which leads to increased live-
lihood risks, as the farmers are inexperienced in handling the erratic and uncertain 
markets and climate.
The focus on environmental conservation, contrasting to (agricultural or forest) food 
production, in the PES/REDD cases, creates a great conflict between production 
and conservation. There is a risk of losing the focus on ecosystem service provision 
as the goal. In the alternative approaches we have described how instead the produc-
tion activities are integrated with securing ecosystem service provision, as local eco-
system services are the most important production support inputs. By this arrange-
ment, the incentives for securing ecosystem service provision are integrated with the 
incentives to increase food production. The key question is how such systems can be 
supported from outside, if it means more human work (making the products more 
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expensive to produce). Alternatively, could societies tax production systems that do 
not provide (or even threaten) ecosystem service provision (in accordance with the 
‘Polluters Pay Principle’)?
Agriculture and forestry are integrated in smallholders’ livelihood strategies
Many farming families in forest areas find themselves in increasingly harsh social, 
economic and ecological conditions. Moving production, or parts of production, 
to primary forest areas is one of their possible adaptive responses to improve the 
household situation (as in the Peru and Vietnam cases). This means that in order 
to decrease pressure on forest, farming has to be included in the discussion. In the 
Tanzania Suledo case the approach for forest conservation was to include agricultural 
activities and farmers’ views of their agricultural production into the forest conser-
vation approach. The Tanzania-Suledo case stands out as different as it has taken a 
particularly integrated livelihood approach when working for conserving the forest, 
which we see as one of the components to why Suledo has been successful. Such an 
approach where production and conservation are integrated, would also be valuable 
in other areas, where for example shifting cultivation is practiced and would have the 
potential to find environmental management approaches feasible and beneficial for 
local smallholders.
In several of the cases the PES initiative limited the focus to one ecosystem or 
singeled out a specific ecosystem service, for example carbon sequestration in the 
REDD cases of Brazil, Tanzania, and forest cover the Vietnam case. However, eco-
system services in a landscape are not fragmented, they interact in complex patterns, 
and if aiming for increasing ecosystem service provision they need to be handled 
as the interacting web of services they are. There are several examples on how the 
promotion of one particular ecosystem service might affect other ecosystem services 
negatively or how contradictory PES systems might impede the good management 
of several ecosystem services implemented on the same land (as the Swedish example 
with for caring for semi-natural grazing lands). When PES/REDD schemes focus on 
a narrow forest protection approach it misses the opportunities of building on local 
knowledge systems in integrated agriculture-forestry systems and thereby long-term 
sustainable management of forests. The non-PES cases presented from Peru, Tanzania 
and Vietnam illustrate that there are valuable local capacities in community forest 
management and integrated agriculture-forestry systems that could be improved, 
developed and built on at larger scales. There is a need to include agriculture in the 
forest management solutions, as it is part of local livelihood strategies, i.e. to have an 
integrated livelihood perspective in ecosystem service management initiatives. We 
argue that such an integrated approach to ecosystem services is likely to be more 
successful in maintaining ecosystem services than for example REDD initiatives, 
focusing on forest conservation, because it does not clash with livelihood interests of 
the forest dependent communities. 
How to include farmers’ knowledge, initiative and creativity
The PES concept is focused on economical incentives, environmental conservation, 
and a control paradigm for administration and evaluation, which all have been chal-
lenged in recent research (see section 1.4). As ecosystem services are not operating 
as solitary activities, but as interactive processes in an open, dynamic complex reality 
under constant changing conditions, there will be a need for incentive structures that 
also operate in such dynamic settings.The economical incentives focus take an per-
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spective on changing peoples behaviour based on an individualistic and profit driven 
view, instead of challenging peoples’ social responsibility as citizens. This also have 
consequences for how such incentive structures will be organized and implemented, 
especially on the degree of participation of the actors that are supposed to change 
their behaviours (especially farmers and foresters), i.e. extensive management rules 
and control of action taken. A problem with such an approach is that it fails to include 
the resource of farmers’ own (contextually adapted) knowledge, as well as their initia-
tive and creativity.  This has been formulated as a problem in all our case studies, as 
well as documented in literature. In our PES case studies, all cases were top down ini-
tiatives, with no or little participations from the actors to whom it should be imple-
mented, and who should secure the ecosystem service provision on their land. In all 
cases farmers also highlighted this as a problem, or/and showed very little knowledge 
about the underlying thinking of the PES they were supposed to subscribe to or 
be indirectly involved in. On the other hand, the Brazilian case also shows how the 
implementation of REDD, as a transnational control-system, can strengthen a local 
group’s right to their own territory, and, ideally, obtain a transnational monitoring 
system, which makes it harder for local power holders to invade and log their forests. 
In the ‘alternative’ approaches to PES, the involvement of the farmers’ own know-
ledge, initiative and creativity is on the other hand highlighted in this report as one 
of the most important properties for securing ecosystem service provision. In those 
case studies, the incentives come either as a conscious management strategy, based 
on the understanding of the underlying environmental problem (as the conventional 
farmer in the Swedish case), or/and an understanding how the chosen alternative 
production system is related to, and based on, the capacity of the local ecosystem 
services (the organic farmers in the Swedish case, the innovative farmers in the 
Peruvian case, and the Tanzania Suledo case).
From a poverty perspective the payment local communities will receive through the 
PES projects may be valuable contributions, but in reality they may actually inhibit 
local groups’ capacity to secure people’s livelihoods. There is an urgent need to 
conduct economic and social evaluations of the actual impacts of the PES payments. 
The compensation is often low. In Peru it is calculated that indigenous groups will 
receive less than 4 USD per hectare and year for maintaining their forest. One might 
also question how long the global community will be ready to continue to pay for 
forest conservation incentives such as REDD? Will these compensations be around 
two decades from now? Two decades is a very short period in forest management 
context, but a quite long time period when it comes to transnational agreements. 
This raises questions about long-term sustainability of an initiative such as REDD. 
REDD is the main focus in the current PES debate. Since REDD’s main objective 
focuses on carbon sequestration, there is a risk that attention to ecosystem services 
connected to water, soil and food is reduced.  This is not in the interest of the poor. 
The tension between environmental goals and livelihoods is likely to continue unless 
there is a clear recognition of the connection between improved access to the forests 
and improved livelihoods of the poor. An attitude shift would be required, where the 
smallholders can be seen as knowledgeable managers of local ecosystems, rather than 
people who need to be paid to stay away from the forest.
Livelihood priorities and concerns of poor households need to be considered to a 
larger extent than today.  The proverb of ‘not seeing the forest for all the trees’ gets a 
new meaning in that, when the policy makers focus only on the trees, they become 
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blind to the possibilities of developing systems where the households take care of the 
soil cover, soil quality and water systems, because their livelihoods depend on it, e.g. 
integrated production systems of food crops, forest trees, fruit trees, cash crops, medi-
cal herbs etc. 
The concept of PES puts the focus on the ecosystem services, which could be an 
advantage if taken seriously. It moves attention away from the trees per se, to a view 
of the landscape in terms of what it produces; reduced soil erosion, improved water 
access, food, medicine, firewood, carbon sequestration, etc.  The focus is also on who 
benefits from the different ‘services’ that the environment/ecosystem produces, both 
locally and regionally. 
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Concluding discussion and 
recommendations
The focus of this study is to discuss the implications different strategies to support 
ecosystem service provision have on local livelihoods in distinct settings. The study 
is based on both literature reviews and on case studies in five different countries in 
four continents. One of the studied approaches to increase the provision of eco-
system services is to economically reward local groups of people who maintain the 
ecosystem services, provided on their land and water resources. This approach, called 
payment of ecosystem services (PES), is becoming increasingly common, and can 
be regarded as an internationally designed ‘Master Plan’ for future ecosystem service 
provision. We have also explored alternative initiatives that can contribute to secur-
ing the provision of ecosystem services, mainly within smallholder farming systems. 
The focus in this approach is on how to achieve an increase of agricultural/forest 
production by supporting local ecosystem services (for example, soil fertility and 
structure, pollination, micro climate, biological pests control). Other forms of ecosys-
tem services, operating on a bigger scale, will emerge as a ‘by-product’ (e.g. carbon 
sequestration caused by increased soil humus in a fertile soil, biodiversity).
Our points of entry have been that:
1.  Ecosystem services are fundamental for life support.
2.  Land areas where ecosystem services are to be provided are already inhab-
ited and used in different ways to provide local people’s livelihood.
There are no global solutions….
In this study we discuss PES (and specifically REDD) in terms of their character as 
transnational master plans, which share major objectives and schemes of implemen-
tation. As ecosystem services are not operating as solitary activities, but as interactive 
processes in an open, dynamic complex reality under constant changing conditions, 
there is a need for incentive structures that also operate in such dynamic settings. 
The outcomes are thereby very interconnected to local economic, political and 
social contexts. For example, in the case studies from Brazil REDD appears to have 
offered a possibility for local people to make their voice heard against exploitation of 
their land and water sheds to a greater extent than previously. In the Tanzanian case 
REDD was implemented top down, there was very little local understanding about 
goals and potential benefits for the local villages, and thus little engagement to make 
the project work.We argue that initiatives that aim to support ecosystem service 
provision must be adjusted to their local context, to existing institutions, and to local 
people’s prevailing livelihood strategies and needs
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… but certain factors must always be addressed.
Even though we argue that there are no overarching global solutions and every 
project must be adjusted to its own context, our case studies reveal some striking 
similarities and thereby general key factors to consider for a pro-poor development, 
when implementing PES/REDD schemes. These conditions are based on the prem-
ises that people are engaged in a process of continuous learning, that they are able to 
use their own creativity in the construction and maintenance of their own systems 
of livelihood. 
Local people must be involved in planning, design and implementation processes
The PES concept is focused on economical incentives, environmental conservation, 
and a control paradigm for administration and evaluation (which all have been chal-
lenged in recent research). The economic incentives focus take an perspective on 
changing people’s behavior based on an individualistic and profit driven view, instead 
of challenging people’s social responsibility as citizens. This also have consequences 
for how such incentive structure will be organized and implemented, especially for 
the actors’ degree of participation, who are supposed to change their behaviours, 
i.e. extensive management rules and control of actions taken. A problem with such 
an approach is that it fails to include the resource of farmers’ own (contextually 
adapted) knowledge, as well as their initiative and creativity. 
In our PES case studies, all case-studies, except the Brazilian one, were top down 
initiatives with no or little participations from the local target groups, who are sup-
posed to secure the ecosystem service provision on their land. In all case-studies 
farmers also highlighted this as a problem, or/and showed very little knowledge 
about the underlying rationale of the PES they were supposed to subscribe to or 
be indirectly involved in. In the ‘alternative’ approaches to PES in this report, the 
involvement of the farmers’ own knowledge, initiative and creativity is highlighted 
as one of the most important properties for securing ecosystem service provision. In 
these case-studies, the incentives are either a conscious management strategy, based 
on the understanding of the underlying environmental problem, or/and a compre-
hension of how the chosen alternative production system is related to, and based on, 
the capacity of the local ecosystem services
We therefore argue that targeted local communities must be active in the planning 
from the beginning, so that their own experiences, and creativity are integrated into 
the planning process. The case studies demonstrate the importance of building on 
local capacity, i.e. seeing the local communities as part of the solution and build-
ing on existing knowledge, needs and local institutions.Local people should not be 
looked upon as a problem (as destroyers of ecosystem services), but a central compo-
nent of the solution (as managers of maintained/increased ecosystem service provi-
sion). However, they should not be delegated the role of  employed forest guards, as 
in the Vietnamese case, but helped to maintain and improve agricultural practices 
and to develop other alternative livelihood strategies, which emanates from local 
people’s practices, learning processes, and creativity (as the Tanzania Suledo case). 
The payment local communities will receive through the PES projects may appear 
to be a valuable contribution to decrease poverty, but in reality such projects risk  
inhibiting local people’s capacity to secure their livelihoods. The compensations are 
often very small and one might also question for how long the global community 
will be ready to continue to pay for forest conservation incentives, such as REDD. 
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These risks raise questions about the long-term sustainability of an initiative such as 
REDD. 
Ecosystem service provision and production needs to be integrated 
All case-studies demonstrate how agricultural and forestry uses compete for the 
same land, and land uses overlap in several ways.There is often a conflicting division 
between forest and agricultural land, as well as between production and conserva-
tion, in the PES discourse and debate. We want to question if this division is useful 
for an effective management of ecosystem services. In practice the division between 
forest and agriculture is blurred, and shifting cultivation (found in all cases except in 
the Swedish one) is a land use system that brings this tension to a head. For small-
holders, it is a constant trade-off between conservation and production. 
There is a need to include agriculture in the forest management solutions, as it is 
part of local livelihood strategies, i.e. to have an integrated livelihood perspective in 
ecosystem service management initiatives, but also because good farming practices 
has potential to provide ecosystems services as positive byproducts. The Tanzania-
Suledo case stands out as different since it has taken a particularly integrated liveli-
hood approach when working for conserving the forest, The alternative non-PES 
case studies from Peru, Tanzania and Vietnam illustrate that there are valuable local 
capacities inherent in community forest management and integrated agriculture-
forestry systems, which could be improved, and developed on larger scales.
In several of the case-studies the PES initiative limited the focus to one ecosystem 
or singled out a specific ecosystem service, thus risking to lose  focus on ecosystem 
service provision as the main goal. However, ecosystem services in a landscape are 
not fragmented, they interact in complex patterns, and if there is an intention to 
increase ecosystem service provision they need to be handled as the interacting web 
of services they are.
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The ongoing degradation of ecosystems threaten 
future food production and the international commu-
nity thus urgently has to plan for how to secure fun-
damental life-support services for the future, so called 
ecosystem services (ES). Examples of such ES are cli-
mate regulation, nutrient cycles, fresh water provision, 
etc.This report is focused on two distinct strategies to 
make land users in tropical rainforest areas continue to 
provide ecosystem services. 
The first approach, Payment for Ecosystem Services 
(PES), is an economic instrument designed at global 
and national levels. Several PES schemes are currently 
implemented in a global context where increasing 
human demands for food, fibre and fuel are accelera-
ting competition for land. The overall aim of the PES 
projects covered by this report is to lower the emission 
of green house gas on national and global levels and 
they are especially directed towards forest areas. The 
PES projects specify that specific rural groups are 
paid if they agree to protect, manage or restore the 
ecosystem service provisioning system within their 
forest territories. This report highlights that many PES 
initiatives are being implemented with a ‘conservation 
perspective’, rather than seeing ecosystem services as 
integrated with production and livelihoods. 
There are also alternative strategies to manage eco-
system services. In this report we put an emphasis on 
an approach where production and conservation are 
planned for within the same landscape and produc-
tion systems. Many smallholders already integrate and 
maintain ecosystem services in their agricultural/forest 
production systems in a long-term perspective, while 
producing food, fibre and fuel for the households’ own 
consumption as well as for sale. In such a system, the 
local communities are totally dependent on the ecosys-
tem services to re-generate conditions for their agricul-
tural production and/or forest extraction. The focus in 
such farming-forestry systems, using little or no inputs, 
which are totally dependent on renewable resources, 
is on how to increase agricultural/forest production by 
supporting local  ecosystem services, such as soil fer-
tility and structure, pollination, micro climate, biological 
control of crop pests, etc. The ecosystem services fun-
ctions, such as carbon sequestration, then emerge as a 
‘by-product’ out of these production systems. Increased 
soil humus in the soil and biomass accumulation are 
other examples of such ‘by-products’.
We want to illustrate potentials and challenges with 
the aforementioned two approaches to secure eco-
system provisions, and how they are articulated within 
their specific contexts. This report explores these two 
approaches by examining case-studies in tropical 
forest areas in Peru, Brazil, Tanzania and Vietnam, as 
well as the experiences of EU-designed PES schemes 
for subsidies/support so as to achieve environmental 
protection in Sweden. 
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